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INTRODUCTION 
The pervasive involvement of the United States tax system1 with 
individual members of society and the importance of tax collection to 
government operation make a sound system of tax administration imperative.  
Good tax policy is often said to require efficiency, equity, transparency, 
simplicity, and administrability.2  An efficient tax system requires a high rate 
of voluntary self-reporting, reducing the costs of tax collection and increasing 
administrability.3 
A high rate of voluntary compliance requires, in part, that the tax system 
be equitable.  Equity is often separated into two components: vertical and 
horizontal equity.4  Vertical equity is concerned with a taxpayer’s ability to pay 
and requires that those with a greater ability to do so pay a greater amount of 
tax.5  Horizontal equity concerns whether similarly situated taxpayers are 
treated similarly.6  Both types of equity can have substantive, as well as 
procedural components.7 
Although most taxpayers pay their taxes when due, some taxpayers do 
not.8  The importance of tax collection to government operations requires that 
fewer restrictions be placed on the collection of tax debts than the collection of 
other debts.9  Less restrictive collection rules are necessary to ensure efficient, 
 
 1. Every person working in the United States, most United States citizens, and every entity 
doing business in the United States are likely to have some interaction with the federal tax system 
at least annually.  I.R.C. § 6012(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (setting forth requirements for 
individuals, estates, trusts, and corporations to file annual tax returns); id. § 6031(a) (2000 & 
Supp. IV 2004) (requiring partnerships to file information returns). 
 2. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO-05-1009SP, UNDERSTANDING THE 
TAX REFORM DEBATE:  BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, & QUESTIONS 24 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, 
UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d051009sp.pdf. 
 3. Overall taxpayer voluntary compliance is estimated to be 83.7 percent.  OFFICE OF 
RESEARCH, IRS, TAX YEAR 2001 FEDERAL TAX GAP (2006) [hereinafter FEDERAL TAX GAP] 
(reporting a noncompliance rate of 16.3%), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ 
tax_gap_figures.pdf.  The voluntary compliance rate is highest among taxpayers with little 
opportunity to underreport, for example, wage earners who are subject to information reporting, 
and lowest among those with the greatest opportunity to underreport, for example, self-employed 
persons who are not subject to information reporting.  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., IRS, 
2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2006) [hereinafter NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 
REPORT]  (citing IRS News Release, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb, 14, 2006)). 
 4. GAO, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE, supra note 2, at 27–28. 
 5. Id. at 28.  An alternative view of vertical equity suggests that taxes should be paid 
according to the benefits the taxpayer received.  Id. at 29. 
 6. Id. at 27. 
 7. See id. at 26–30. 
 8. FEDERAL TAX GAP, supra note 3. 
 9. Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) (“Where, as here, adequate opportunity is 
afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure 
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i.e. prompt and cost-effective, tax collection.  Despite the need to limit the 
courts’ intrusion into tax collection, Congress has interposed additional 
procedural safeguards in favor of taxpayers. 
Judicial review of tax collection decisions is limited,10 but it is similar to 
the review of discretionary decisions of other administrative agencies.  As this 
Article demonstrates, the most efficient and equitable standards to be applied 
during judicial review of tax collection decisions would be those used during 
judicial review of similar agency decisions.11  Similarities between tax 
collection decisions and other agencies’ decisions suggest that the well-
established standards used to review administrative decisions should be used 
during the review of tax collection decisions.  The standard of review applied 
to a case has a significant impact on the court’s approach to that case.  Well-
established standards provide certainty as to both result and judicial 
procedure.12  Traditional standards of review, applied as commonly understood 
in administrative law, better promote a sound tax system than special standards 
of judicial review used only in tax collection cases. 
Despite the need to limit the courts’ intrusions into tax collection, 
Congress has interposed additional procedural safeguards in favor of 
taxpayers.  Consistent use of administrative law standards of judicial review, 
along with administrative law’s substantive and procedural rules, would 
minimize the courts’ intrusions into tax collection and ensure that taxpayers are 
treated consistently.  However, the Tax Court, which has concurrent or 
exclusive jurisdiction in most taxpayer-initiated tax collection cases,13 has 
concluded that administrative law is inapplicable in tax collection cases.14  
Even when conducting abuse of discretion review, the Tax Court has 
concluded that in tax collection cases it is not required to use the rule of record 
review that is applied by other courts.15  Because the Internal Revenue Service 
 
prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently 
sustained.”); see also Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20–31 
(2004) [hereinafter Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process]. 
 10. See I.R.C. §§ 6015, 6320, 6330(c), 6404(e) (West Supp. 2007). 
 11. “Traditional” abuse of discretion review is the kind performed by the district courts 
when reviewing discretionary decisions of administrative agencies.  This standard is more fully 
discussed in Part III.A.2, infra. 
 12. Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Reinterpreting the Role of Special Trial Judges 
Through Standards of Review (forthcoming 2008) (draft at 2, on file with author). 
 13. Most decisions regarding the collection of taxes are not reviewable.  I.R.C. § 7422(a) 
(2000).  The primary means for review of tax questions is through deficiency jurisdiction in the 
Tax Court, I.R.C. § 6213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), or refund jurisdiction in the district courts and 
the United States Court of Federal Claims, I.R.C. § 7422. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455, 465 (8th Cir. 2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
432 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:429 
is an agency,16 judicial review of its decisions should be conducted using the 
same standards of review used by courts reviewing other agencies’ decisions, 
applying administrative law and using traditional abuse of discretion review, 
including limiting the review to the administrative record. 
Part I begins with a brief discussion of the evolution of federal income tax 
litigation to provide context for the debate over the appropriate approach to 
and applicability of administrative law in judicial review of tax collection 
decisions.  Next, Part II discusses some of the relatively recent changes to the 
courts’ jurisdiction to review certain tax collection decisions.  This discussion 
compares and explains the different approaches used by the Tax Court and 
district courts.  Part III summarizes the relevant rules of administrative law.  
This section discusses the difference between formal and informal agency 
action and the approaches courts commonly use to review an agency decision 
made following informal adjudication.  It also discusses the historical uses of 
administrative law in tax cases and the courts’ approach to the review of tax 
collection decisions.  Part IV describes the benefits to tax administration of 
applying administrative law during the review of tax collection decisions.17  
The benefits include efficient tax collection, cost-effective protection of 
taxpayers, increased certainty of result, and increased horizontal equity.  This 
Article concludes that judicial review of tax collection decisions should be 
conducted like the review of comparable administrative decisions, using the 
rules and standards of administrative law. 
I.  INCOME TAX LITIGATION 
This section provides a brief overview of the history of income tax 
litigation.  While much is omitted, this background may help explain the 
approaches taken by the courts in income tax litigation. 
Sovereign immunity bars suits against the government, except when the 
government consents to being sued.18  The United States government has 
waived sovereign immunity in many circumstances.  However, suits to prevent 
the assessment or collection of taxes remain an exception.  In most cases, the 
government has not waived sovereign immunity in cases brought to enjoin tax 
 
 16. Throughout this Article, the Internal Revenue Service is interchangeably referred to also 
as the “IRS” and the “Service.” 
 17. This Article does not question the continued need for tax collection to proceed 
expeditiously with minimal intrusion by the courts.  In addition, this Article does not advocate 
increasing the limitations imposed on tax collection.  Tax collection is and should be subject to 
fewer restrictions than those imposed on private creditors to ensure that all taxpayers bear their 
share of the burden and that others’ tax dollars are not used to pursue and force noncompliant 
taxpayers into compliance. 
 18. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 88–89 (1875). 
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collection.19  Unless a deficiency notice is issued, taxpayers are not entitled to 
judicial relief until after the tax is paid.20  However, relatively recent changes 
in the tax law have created additional exceptions to the general rule that 
taxpayers cannot sue to stop tax collection.21 
Although judicial involvement in tax collection slows the process, some 
judicial intervention has been viewed as necessary to ensure fairness; however, 
that involvement is strictly limited to prevent the use of the judicial system to 
halt tax collection and impede the government’s operation.22  Not only would 
excessive judicial involvement harm operations, but widespread opportunities 
to slow tax collections could encourage other taxpayers to engage in dilatory 
taxpaying behavior at the expense of taxpayers who promptly comply with 
their tax obligations.23  Permitting excessive delays or opportunities to avoid 
payment of taxes potentially requires everyone else to pay more taxes.24  
Moreover, courts and juries could be sympathetic to taxpayers experiencing 
financial hardship or opposed to government policies.  Unrestricted access to 
the courts to challenge tax assessment and collection could be very harmful; 
“the very existence of the government might be placed in the power of a 
hostile judiciary.”25 
Although the Constitution places significant limits on governmental 
interference with private property, due process does not require that a taxpayer 
be given a pre-deprivation opportunity to challenge a tax assessment.26  
 
 19. For example, suits to enjoin or restrain tax collection or assessment are not available in 
most cases.  I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2000). 
 20. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150–51 (1960).  In many instances, prior to the 
assessment of the tax, it is possible for the taxpayer to seek prepayment review in the Tax Court.  
However, if a request for deficiency redetermination is not timely made, or a notice of deficiency 
is not issued, prepayment review is unavailable.  I.R.C. § 6213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. Cheatham, 92 U.S. at 89. 
 23. The current tax gap is estimated to cost each taxpayer an additional $2,200 per year.  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 REPORT, supra note 3.  Research indicates that the 
perception that others do not pay their share of taxes will reduce voluntary compliance.  See, e.g., 
Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles, in 2 
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 211–14 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. 
Scholz eds., 1989); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340–
44 (2001); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1487 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2185 (1996); Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach to 
Collection and Accuracy-Related Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 123 (2001). 
 24. Cheatham, 92 U.S. at 89. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 595–97 (1931).  In Cheatham, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before 
the money is finally exacted, the general government has wisely made the payment of the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
434 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:429 
Because of the importance of tax collection to government operations, fewer 
restrictions are placed on tax collectors than other creditors.27  Historically, 
taxpayers were required to pay the tax and then sue for a refund.28  This 
approach has long been held to adequately protect taxpayer rights.29 
Legislators also understand the need for tax collection to occur with 
minimal outside interference.  Even then, refund suits are subject to 
limitations: 
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any 
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or 
collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the 
Secretary . . . .30 
During a refund case, the court conducts a trial de novo to determine 
whether the taxpayer is entitled to the requested refund.31 
 
tax claimed . . . a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom 
the tax is assessed.  In the internal-revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such 
suit shall be brought until the remedy by appeal has been tried; and, if brought after this, it 
must be within six months after the decision on the appeal.  We regard this as a condition 
on which alone the government consents to litigate the lawfulness of the original tax.  It is 
not a hard condition.  Few governments have conceded such a right on any condition.  If 
the compliance with this condition requires the party aggrieved to pay the money, he must 
do it.  He cannot, after the decision is rendered against him, protract the time within which 
he can contest that decision in the courts by his own delay in paying the money.  It is 
essential to the honor and orderly conduct of the government that its taxes should be 
promptly paid, and drawbacks speedily adjusted; and the rule prescribed in this class of 
cases is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 
92 U.S. at 89. 
 27. Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595 (“Where, as here, adequate opportunity is afforded for a later 
judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt performance of 
pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained.”); see also Camp, Tax 
Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 9. 
 28. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 282 
(1855). 
[P]robably there are few governments which do or can permit their claims for public 
taxes, either on the citizen or the officer employed for their collection or disbursement, to 
become subjects of judicial controversy, according to the course of the law of the land. 
Imperative necessity has forced a distinction between such claims and all others, which 
has sometimes been carried out by summary methods of proceeding, and sometimes by 
systems of fines and penalties, but always in some way observed and yielded to. 
Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595–97.  Taxpayers may file a refund suit following a 
denial of the refund request or after receiving no response to the claim for six months. 
 30. I.R.C. § 7422 (2000). 
 31. Id. (granting jurisdiction to the district courts after a request for refund has been denied 
or allowed to go unanswered for six months).  The United States district courts and the United 
States Court of Federal Claims make their own findings of fact and apply the tax law to those 
facts to determine whether the taxpayer is entitled to a refund and whether any offsets are 
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An effective tax system must be fair. To this end, Congress has repeatedly 
expanded taxpayers’ rights,32 often by providing additional opportunities for 
judicial intervention.  In 1924, there were concerns that some taxpayers, who 
could not afford to pay first, would be harmed if refund litigation was the only 
means available to challenge individual tax liabilities.33  As a result, Congress 
created the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), an executive agency that exercised 
semi-judicial power.34  The BTA and its successor, the United States Tax 
Court, provided an opportunity for pre-payment, pre-assessment review of tax 
determinations.35  The BTA’s jurisdiction was limited to redetermination of a 
taxpayer’s income and profits taxes, estate taxes, or gift taxes.36 
 
applicable.  Id.  In addition to permitting taxpayers to challenge a tax due without payment, the 
Tax Court offers a specialized forum and judges who generally practiced tax law before their 
appointment to the court.  1 GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL 
CIVIL TAX CONTROVERSIES § 1.07 (2nd ed. 1996). 
 32. This has been compared to attempts to round out the square corners of the tax law by 
applying notions of equity.  Bryan T. Camp, The Unhappy Marriage of Law and Equity in Joint 
Return Liability, 108 TAX NOTES 1307, 1307 (2005). 
 33. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).  See also Charles D. Hamel, United 
States Board of Tax Appeals, 13 GEO. L.J. 20, 20–21 (1924).  There were earlier, unsuccessful 
proposals to create a board of tax appeals.  Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An 
Historical Analysis, Part II, Creation of the Board of Tax Appeals—The Revenue Act of 1924, 40 
ALB. L. REV. 53, 57–58 (1975) [hereinafter Dubroff, Part II] (discussing prior proposals by the 
Treasury, the American Mining Congress, the United States Chamber of Commerce, Senator 
Pomerene, and the Tax Simplification Board). 
 34. Hamel, supra note 33, at 22 (“The Board of Tax Appeals is in effect a judicial tribunal of 
limited jurisdiction.”). 
 35. See generally Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 
Part I, The Origins of the Tax Court, 40 ALB. L. REV. 7, 41–42 (1975) [hereinafter Dubroff, Part 
I]; Dubroff, Part II, supra note 33; Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical 
Analysis, Part III, The Revenue Act of 1926—Improving the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 ALB L. 
REV. 253 (1976) [hereinafter Dubroff, Part III]; Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: 
An Historical Analysis, Part IV, The Board Becomes a Court, 41 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1977) 
[hereinafter Dubroff, Part IV]; Joseph R. Cook & Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: 
An Historical Analysis, Part V, Pretrial Procedure, 41 ALB. L. REV. 639 (1977); Harold Dubroff 
& Dan S. Grossman, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part VI, Trial and 
Post-Trial Procedure, 42 ALB. L. REV. 191 (1978).  In 1942, recognizing its inherently judicial 
nature, Congress changed the BTA’s name to the Tax Court of the United States, but continued 
its status as an executive agency.  Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 730; Dubroff, 
Part IV, supra, at 11–20.  In 1969, the Tax Court was removed from the executive branch, 
became an Article I court, and was renamed the United States Tax Court.  Steve Johnson, The 
Phoenix and the Perils of Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court 
Decisions is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 281 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, The Phoenix and 
the Perils of Second Best].  This compromise followed an unsuccessful bid to make the Tax Court 
an Article III court.  Dubroff, Part IV, supra, at 3.  Efforts to remove the Tax Court from the 
executive branch began in 1926.  Dubroff, Part III, supra, at 24; Dubroff, Part IV, supra, at 3. 
 36. Hamel, supra note 33, at 22. 
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Although the BTA was part of the Department of Treasury, it was separate 
from and independent of the BIR.37  Instead of relying on the administrative 
record,38 the BTA conducted a de novo review and made its own determination 
of the tax liability.39  The Tax Court continues to use de novo review in 
deficiency cases.40 
In deficiency cases, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to redetermine income, 
gift, estate, and certain excise tax deficiencies.41  But, even in deficiency cases 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is not plenary: “The Tax Court shall have no 
jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund . . . unless a 
timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then 
only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such petition.”42 
Over time, Congress has expanded the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to include 
many other types of tax cases.43  The Tax Court’s jurisdiction now includes 
authority to make certain declaratory judgments;44 determine employment 
 
 37. Id. at 22–25 (describing the newly-created Board of Tax Appeals: “It is not merely a 
newly created higher division of the Bureau [of Internal Revenue] or even of the Treasury 
Department.  It is, in the language of the statute, ‘an independent agency in the executive branch 
of the Government,’ and as such it is expected to act independently in all its determinations.”)  To 
create credibility and encourage taxpayers and their advisors to view it as an alternative to refund 
litigation, the independence of the BTA from the BIR was essential.  Id. 
 38. The burden of proof generally remains with the taxpayer to establish that there is no 
deficiency.  However, the taxpayer, having all of the records, is in the best position to establish 
the correct tax liability.  See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: 
Perceptions and Realities of the New Tax Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 414 
(1999); Adriana Wos-Mysliwiec, Note, The Internal Revenue Restructuring And Reform Act Of 
1998: Does It Really Shift The Burden Of Proof To The IRS?, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
301 (1999); but see I.R.C. § 7491 (2000). 
 39. I.R.C. § 6213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 40. I.R.C. § 7459(b) (2000). 
 41. I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6015 (West Supp. 2007) (requests innocent spouse relief); § 6320 
(West Supp. 2007) (collection due process hearings relating to the filing of a Notice of Federal 
Tax Lien); § 6330 (West Supp. 2007) (collection due process hearings relating to notices of intent 
to levy); § 6404 (West Supp. 2007) (requests for abatement of interest); § 7476(a) (2000) 
(declaratory judgments relating to certain qualified plans); § 7477 (2000) (declaratory judgments 
relating to valuation of gifts); § 7478 (2000) (declaratory judgment relating to status of 
government obligations); § 7479 (2000) (declaratory judgments relating to the eligibility of an 
estate for an installment plan under section 6166). 
 44. I.R.C. § 7428 (West Supp. 2007) (allowing Tax Court to issue declaratory judgment 
about status and classification of 501(c)(3) organizations); § 7476 (allowing the Tax Court to 
issue a declaratory judgment relating to the qualification of certain retirement plans); § 7477 
(allowing the Tax Court to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the value of certain gifts); § 
7478 (allowing the Tax Court to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the status of certain 
government obligations); § 7479 (allowing the Tax Court to issue a declaratory judgment 
regarding the availability of installment payments for an estate under I.R.C. section 6166). 
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status;45 and review IRS determinations regarding requests for innocent spouse 
relief,46 the availability of interest abatement,47 and certain collection 
decisions.48  Nonetheless, the Tax Court remains a specialized court with 
limited jurisdiction.49 
The Tax Court’s jurisdiction is only a subset of tax litigation and is 
generally not exclusive.  The generalist judges in the district courts, Court of 
Federal Claims, and the bankruptcy court also have jurisdiction to decide many 
of the same tax cases.50  Thus, these courts frequently are called on to interpret 
the tax law.  Because concurrent jurisdiction exists in some cases, the taxpayer 
often has a choice of forum.51  However, in other cases, a single court 
possesses exclusive jurisdiction.52 
The next section discusses how Congress has expanded the availability of 
judicial consideration of challenges to tax collection.  This part also looks at 
the approach the courts have used in collection cases. 
 
 45. I.R.C. § 7436(a) (2000). 
 46. I.R.C. § 6015(f) (West Supp. 2007); see, e.g., Cheshire v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 183 (2000), 
aff’d, 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 47. I.R.C. § 6404(h)(1) (West Supp. 2007) (“The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction over any 
action brought by a taxpayer who meets the requirements referred to in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) 
to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of 
discretion . . . .”). 
 48. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (West Supp. 2007). 
 49. See Comm’r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987); Comm’r v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 
320 U.S. 418, 419–20 (1943); Christine K. Lane, On-the-Record Review of CDP Determinations: 
An Examination of Policy Reasons Encouraging Judges to Stick to the Administrative Record, 6 
FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 149, 164–66 (2007) (discussing the impact that the Tax Court’s limited 
jurisdiction may have in CDP cases). 
 50. The district courts, the United States Court of Federal Claims, the United States Courts 
of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court all handle tax cases.  I.R.C. § 7422 (2000); 28 
U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).  None of these courts specialize in tax law.  Although there has long been 
debate about the need for specialized courts in tax cases, either at the trial or appellate level, 
generalist judges have navigated the tax code throughout its history.  There has been robust 
scholarly debate about the need for specialized courts in tax cases.  See generally, Louis A. Del 
Cotto, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 5 
(1962); Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and The Proposal Advanced by the Federal 
Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985 (1991); 
Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944); David 
Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17 
(1995); David Lupi-Sher, National Court of Tax Appeals:  An Idea That Never Quite Goes Away, 
81 TAX NOTES 1159 (1998); H. Todd Miller, Comment, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 
YALE L.J. 228 (1975). 
 51. I.R.C. § 6213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); I.R.C. § 7422; 28 U.S.C. § 1346. 
 52. I.R.C. §§ 6015(e)(1), 6330(d)(1) (West Supp. 2007).  An example is the choice a 
taxpayer has between paying the tax and suing for a refund and not paying the tax and petitioning 
for a redetermination of the tax. 
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II.  TAX COURT JURISDICTION RELATING TO IRS COLLECTION DECISIONS 
One way that Congress has expanded taxpayers’ rights is to increase the 
opportunities available to taxpayers to challenge tax collection decisions, both 
administratively and judicially.  Many of the newer opportunities permit 
judicial review of the matter by the Tax Court.  The questions that can be 
raised administratively and judicially are often different than the questions 
raised in deficiency cases; the focus is on means of collection, rather than on 
the amount of tax owed. 
One way to consider the Tax Court’s current jurisdiction is to divide it 
based on the type of inquiry that the court conducts.  The first category 
requires de novo review.  This category includes deficiency redeterminations,53 
issuing declaratory judgments,54 and determining employment status.55  The 
questions presented in these cases require that the Tax Court receive evidence 
and make findings of fact and arrive at conclusions of law. 
In the second category, the primary inquiry is whether the Service 
permissibly exercised its discretion.  These cases include tax collection cases, 
such as innocent spouse, collection due process, and interest abatement 
determinations.56  The authorizing statutes direct the court, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion.57  To 
determine whether an agency abused its discretion, the courts generally review 
only the record created during the agency proceeding.58  When conducting 
abuse of discretion review, the court usually will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency.59 
The district courts and the Court of Federal Claims oversee review actions 
of numerous federal executive agencies.  Thus, these courts apply the APA and 
administrative law frequently.  Historically, the Tax Court has not had many 
opportunities to use administrative law or apply deferential standards to the 
considerations of agency decisions.  Perhaps because most of its jurisdictional 
grants require that the Tax Court conduct de novo review, the Tax Court has 
concluded that it is not bound by the APA and need not apply administrative 
 
 53. I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
 54. I.R.C. § 7428 (West Supp. 2007); § 7476 (2000); § 7478 (2000) (permitting the Tax 
Court to issue declaratory judgments regarding exempt organizations, pension plans, and the tax 
exempt status of certain bonds, respectively). 
 55. I.R.C. § 7436 (2000). 
 56. I.R.C. §§ 6015(e)(1), 6330(d)(1), 6404(i) (West Supp. 2007). 
 57. I.R.C. §§ 6015(e)(1), 6330(d)(1), 6404(i); Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 609–10 
(2000) (looking to the legislative history to determine that review of CDP determinations is for 
abuse of discretion, except when the underlying liability is at issue). 
 58. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 59. 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.6 (2d ed. 1997). 
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law principles even when conducting abuse of discretion review.60  The court 
has rationalized this approach in part by looking to its deficiency jurisdiction.61  
Commentators have suggested that one reason that the Tax Court does not 
apply administrative law broadly is because it is an Article I court.62  As this 
Article demonstrates, this approach is not justified by the APA, decisions 
applying and interpreting administrative law, or the APA’s legislative history. 
In deficiency cases, the Tax Court’s de novo fact-finding ensures the 
taxpayer an opportunity to have her tax liability fully reviewed and 
independently determined by a court.63  This promotes a full and final 
adjudication.  Full adjudication is necessary because, following the 
redetermination of a deficiency, challenges to the same tax and year in a refund 
case are usually barred by res judicata.64 
The nature of the review needs to be adjusted to reflect the nature of the 
question presented.  Whether de novo fact-finding is required depends on the 
nature of the substantive rights that are involved.  “It is not necessary that the 
proceeding to be judicial should be one entirely de novo.  It is enough that, 
before the judgment which must be final has been invoked as an exercise of 
judicial power, it shall have certain necessary features.”65  For instance, de 
novo review is unnecessary if the only question that the court can consider is 
whether the agency abused its discretion or acted outside the scope of its 
authority.  Generally, abuse of discretion, or lack thereof, can be determined 
based on the administrative record. 
Before enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998),66 public hearings in 1997 and 1998 drew 
attention to concerns about the means the Service used to collect unpaid taxes 
 
 60. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 96–97 (2004) (citing Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 
50 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring)); see also Eliza Mae Scheibel, Note, Mixing It Up: The Tax 
Court Pairs a De Novo Scope of Review with an Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review Under 
Section 6330(d) in Robinette v. Commissioner, 58 TAX LAW. 941, 943–44 (2005). 
 61. Ewing, 122 T.C. at 37–39 (majority opinion). 
 62. See, e.g., Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of Second Best, supra note 35, at 282 (“In 
short, the Tax Court is now and from its inception has been more a court than an administrative 
agency.  History therefore undercuts an argument for Chevron deference to the Tax Court.”). 
 63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 64. 2 KAFKA & CAVANAGH, supra note 31, §§ 22.01–22.03; MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 11.05[6] (2nd ed. 1991); see also Fluor v. United States, 44 
A.F.T.R.2d 79–5287, 79–5288 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (prior Tax Court decision bars reconsideration in 
a refund suit under doctrine of res judicata). 
 65. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 723 (1929) (discussing the authority of 
the Board of Tax Appeals). 
 66. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 
26 U.S.C.). 
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and the treatment of taxpayers during collections.67  Congress decided to 
increase taxpayer rights during the collection process, making taxpayer rights 
more like the rights of general debtors.68  Congress also attempted to reduce 
some of the inequities possible in cases involving joint and several liability.69  
To accomplish this, Congress created a right to an administrative hearing and 
judicial review before forcible collection of unpaid taxes and expanded the 
availability of innocent spouse relief.70 
The changes were tailored to address the perceived problems with tax 
collection that were brought to the fore during the hearings, including reports 
that in some cases IRS employees abused their power in collections against 
taxpayer assets.  Although the new rights increased the opportunities for 
judicial review in tax collection cases, these rights did not create an unlimited 
or unending opportunity for post-assessment and pre-payment review.  For 
instance, in the context of a tax lien or levy, the taxpayer has only thirty days 
from the date of the notice issued by the IRS to request a hearing and a failure 
to make the request in that time will preclude judicial review.71  Moreover, the 
taxpayer can challenge a liability and tax year only once in a collection action 
subject to judicial review. 
In most post-assessment, pre-payment cases, the only issue before the 
Service is the appropriate means of collecting the assessed tax liability.72  
During a CDP hearing, a taxpayer can propose collection alternatives and raise 
innocent spouse and other defenses.  Requiring these hearings and permitting 
judicial review represent a significant expansion of taxpayer rights.  The 
Service historically had the discretion to determine how to collect a tax 
liability.  Now, after RRA 1998, the courts are permitted to provide some 
 
 67. This concern was manifested in both the widely publicized Congressional hearings and 
in the media coverage of the hearings.  See, e.g., Practices and Procedures of the Internal 
Revenue Service: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997).  These 
hearings were convened on September 23, 24, and 25, 1997.  Hearings on “IRS Restructuring” 
were held on January 28 and 29 and February 5, 11, and 25, 1998.  IRS Restructuring: Hearings 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998).  Hearings on “IRS Oversight” were held 
on April 28, 29, 30, and May 1, 1998.  IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
105th Cong. (1998); see also Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 9, at 
81 (discussing the selection of the stories to be told during the hearing and their effect). 
 68. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
112 Stat. 685 (1998); see also infra Part II.A. 
 69. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§§ 3201, 3401, 112 Stat. 734, 746–747 (1998) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6015, 6320, 6330). 
 70. Id. § 3401, 112 Stat. 746–747 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330).  Moreover, that 
opportunity runs from the time of the issuance of the first notice of federal tax lien or notice of 
intent to levy. 
 71. Kennedy v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 255, 260–61 (2001). 
 72. I.R.C. §§ 6015, 6320, 6330, 6404 (West Supp. 2007). 
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oversight over the tax collection process, allowing the courts to consider 
whether the Service’s decision was a proper exercise of its discretion. 
Not all courts approaching new oversight role have done so in the same 
manner.  The district courts apply the APA and administrative law in tax 
collection cases.  However, the Tax Court has been slow to apply traditional 
abuse of discretion review and administrative law in tax collection cases.73  
This reluctance to apply administrative law is understandable in light of the 
historical jurisdiction of the Tax Court, which was limited to cases that 
required de novo trials.74  In addition, tax law is often treated as separate and 
different from other areas of the law.75  Nevertheless, administrative law and 
its principles are applicable to most tax collection cases, and conducting a de 
novo trial is inconsistent with abuse of discretion review.76 
The next sections examine RRA 1998’s expansion of taxpayer rights and 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  The nature of the expansions will help 
demonstrate the need to apply administrative law in tax collection cases. 
A. Collection Due Process 
Before RRA 1998, taxpayers could not challenge their tax liability in court 
after assessment and before payment.77  Similarly, in most cases taxpayers 
could not challenge the chosen means of collection.78  Post-RRA 1998, 
taxpayers may request that an impartial appeals officer conduct a hearing 
before levy on a taxpayer’s property, after a Notice of Federal Tax Lien 
 
 73. However, it has applied administrative law in other areas, such as the review of Treasury 
Regulations.  See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 143–44 (2006). 
 74. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 75. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax 
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (addressing the concern that “tax law too often is 
mistakenly viewed by lawyers, judges, and law professors as a self-contained body of law” and 
that “this misperception has impaired the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas 
of law that should inform the tax debate”); Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: 
Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
183, 183 (1996) (“Tax law tends to be uninformed by other areas of law.  This insularity has the 
unfortunate consequence of depriving tax and other fields of cross-fertilization.”). 
 76. Prior to the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals, the predecessor to the Tax Court, 
taxpayers were not entitled to pre-payment judicial review of the asserted tax liability.  Dubroff, 
Part I, supra note 35, at 34. 
 77. See I.R.C. § 7421 (2000) (this is the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits suits to restrain 
the collection of taxes in most instances).  Prior to CDP, although some limited administrative 
remedies were available, judicial review was unavailable because that was an area committed to 
the discretion of the IRS.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 78. I.R.C. § 7421. 
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(NFTL), and sometimes in both situations.79  These hearings are referred to as 
“collection due process,” “CDP,” and section 6320 or 6330 hearings. 
CDP hearings provide taxpayers, often through a representative, an 
opportunity to resolve an unpaid tax liability with an appeals officer who has 
had no prior involvement with the specific tax and tax year.80  During the 
hearing, the taxpayer can raise any relevant issues, including proposing 
collection alternatives and innocent spouse defenses.81  The underlying liability 
can be challenged during the hearing only if the taxpayer did not receive a 
notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to challenge the 
underlying liability in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding.82 
A CDP hearing request stops collection action until the taxpayer receives a 
hearing; the suspension of collections frequently continues during judicial 
review of the determination.83  CDP hearings are informal84 and can be 
 
 79. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (West Supp. 2007).  These rights, available with respect to 
collection actions instituted after January 19, 1999, rapidly became one of the most litigated tax 
issues.  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 REPORT, supra note 3, at 556 (noting that collection 
due process litigation has led tax litigation each year since 2003).  Taxpayers are entitled to only 
one CDP hearing for any tax and tax period and then only if it is requested within thirty days of 
the notice of intent to levy.  I.R.C. § 6330(a)(3).  Similarly, a taxpayer must make a request 
within thirty days after the date that is five days after the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien 
(NFTL).  I.R.C. § 6320(a)(3)(B).  A taxpayer who makes a late request for a CDP hearing may 
have an equivalent hearing, but judicial review of the appeals officer’s notice of decision will be 
unavailable.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(i) (2006). 
 80. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3).  The appeals officer who hears the CDP case must have no prior 
involvement in the tax and tax period at issue, unless this is waived by the taxpayer.  I.R.C. § 
6320(b)(3) (for CDP hearing requested after filing of Notice of Federal Tax Lien); § 6330(b)(3) 
(for CDP hearing requested after Notice of Intent to Levy).  The trend to centralize many of the 
Service’s activities means that most CDP cases are sent to a central campus.  TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMININSTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE OFFICE OF 
APPEALS NEEDS TO IMPROVE THE MONITORING OF ITS CAMPUS OPERATIONS QUALITY 3 fig.2 
(2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2007reports/200710071fr.html. 
 81. I.R.C. § 6330(c).  Collection alternatives that can be raised during a CDP hearing include 
installment agreements, substitution of property, and offers-in-compromise.  I.R.C. § 
6330(c)(2)(A).  Certain issues are not properly raised, including the underlying liability in most 
cases and issues raised and considered in a prior administrative hearing.  Id.  During the CDP 
hearing, the appeals officer need not consider all possible collection alternatives, only those 
properly raised by the taxpayer.  Id. Failure to raise an issue at the hearing is likely to result in the 
Tax Court refusing to consider the issue on an appeal of CDP determination.  Magana v. Comm’r, 
118 T.C. 488, 493–94 (2002). 
 82. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).  However, a taxpayer is not considered to have not received a 
notice of deficiency if the taxpayer willfully avoided receipt by refusing delivery.  See, e.g., Sego 
v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604 (2000) (refusing to consider the underlying liability when that taxpayer 
had failed to collect certified mail containing the notice of deficiency). 
 83. I.R.C. § 6330(e). 
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conducted by correspondence,85 by telephone,86 face-to-face, or by a 
combination of methods.87 
During the CDP hearing, the appeals officer must verify compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations, consider relevant issues raised during the 
hearing, and balance the taxpayer’s interest in having tax collection be no more 
intrusive than necessary against the government’s need for efficient collection 
of taxes.88  This balancing is usually set forth in the determination, which is 
often useful during judicial review.  After the hearing, the appeals officer 
issues a notice of determination describing the issues raised during the hearing 
and concluding that collection can go forward, permitting collection to go 
forward in a modified manner, or preventing collection.89  Within thirty days 
after the determination is issued, a taxpayer can request judicial review.90 
 
 84. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (6)(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A 
(6)(d) (concluding that the APA does not apply to CDP hearings); Cox v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 237, 
246 (2006) (citing Katz v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 329, 337 (2000)). 
 85. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (6)(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A 
(6)(d); Cox, 126 T.C. at 246 (citing Katz, 115 T.C. at 337–38). 
 86. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (6)(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A 
(6)(d); Katz, 115 T.C. at 337–38. 
 87. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (6)(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A 
(6)(d); Greene-Thepadi v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 1, 3 (2006).  These methods of conducting a hearing 
are consistent with the methods approved for the conduct of informal hearings by other agencies.  
2 KOCH, supra note 59, §§ 5.13[5], 5.14.  Informal hearings are more fully discussed, infra, Part 
III.A.1.  Recently revised regulations limit the circumstances under which a taxpayer will be 
granted a face-to-face hearing.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A (7)(d) (as amended 2006). 
 88. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (8)(e).  Appeals retains jurisdiction to reconsider 
issues in the event that there is a change in circumstance. 
 89. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007). 
 90. I.R.C. § 6330(d).  Late appeals strip the Tax Court of jurisdiction.  Boyd v. Comm’r, 124 
T.C. 296, 303 (2005).  Similarly, the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision 
letter issued following an equivalent hearing because the CDP request was not made timely.  
Offiler v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
444 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:429 
CDP rights have been widely criticized.91 Judicial review is perhaps the 
most controversial element of CDP rights.92  Initially, district courts and the 
Tax Court shared jurisdiction over CDP appeals.  CDP appeals were to the Tax 
Court if it would have had jurisdiction over the underlying liability93 and to the 
district courts if the Tax Court would not have had jurisdiction over the 
underlying liability.94  Bifurcated review of individual CDP determinations 
was possible.95  However, in 2006 jurisdiction over all collection due process 
cases was consolidated in the Tax Court.96 
The Code does not address the standard of review that the courts must use 
in CDP cases.97  However, the legislative history indicates Congress’s 
expectation that abuse of discretion review would be used, except when the tax 
liability is at issue.98  When the underlying liability is at issue, the courts 
conduct de novo review.99 
 
 91. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 379 (2004); Leslie 
Book, The Collection Due Process Rights, A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction, 41 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1145 (2004); Bryan T. Camp, The Costs of CDP, 105 TAX NOTES 1445 (2004); Bryan T. 
Camp, The Failure of Collection Due Process, Part 1: The Collection Context, 104 TAX NOTES 
969 (2004) [hereinafter Camp, The Failure of CDP, Part 1]; Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of 
CDP, Part 2: Why it Adds No Value, 104 TAX NOTES 1567 (2004) [hereinafter Camp, The 
Failure of CDP, Part 2]; Bryan T. Camp, Replacing CDP, 107 TAX NOTES 1039 (2005); Camp, 
Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 9; Danshera Cords, Collection Due 
Process: The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (2005) [hereinafter 
Cords, The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review]; Danshera Cords, How Much Process is Due? 
I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51 (2004) 
[hereinafter Cords, How Much Process is Due?]; Danshera Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, 
CDP, 108 TAX NOTES 817 (2005) [hereinafter Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, CDP]; Diane L. 
Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction Over Due Process Collection Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 
55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453 (2003). 
 92. Camp, Replacing CDP, supra note 91; Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing CDP, supra 
note 91; Fahey, supra note 91. 
 93. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1)(A). 
 94. § 6330(d)(1)(B).  Appeals from either the district courts or the Tax Court were to the 
appropriate court of appeals.  § 6330. 
 95. A number of bills have been introduced in Congress to consolidate jurisdiction over all 
CDP hearings in the Tax Court.  This approach also has been advocated by the National Taxpayer 
Advocate.  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 372 (2005). 
 96. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat 780, 1019  (2006). 
 97. Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 609–10 (2000); Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181 
(2000).  Because the underlying liability is seldom at issue, under this approach the vast majority 
of CDP determination appeals should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
 98. H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N 
288, 289.  The legislative history does not address the nature of the review to be used in cases 
with both questions of the underlying liability and the appropriateness of a particular collection 
method. 
 99. Id. 
The determination of the appeals officer may be appealed to Tax Court or, where 
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Despite claiming to use the abuse of discretion standard of review, the Tax 
Court’s approach in tax collection cases has more closely resembled de novo 
review.100  Generally, the court weighs all of the evidence and may even 
receive new evidence rather than limiting the consideration to whether the 
appeals officer improperly considered or refused to consider certain evidence.  
As discussed below, the Tax Court may be less comfortable applying a 
deferential standard of judicial review because of its limited experience with 
abuse of discretion review.  Thus, while consolidating jurisdiction in the Tax 
Court may reduce the disparity of treatment between taxpayers in CDP 
cases,101 it does not reduce the importance of having the Tax Court apply the 
appropriate standard. 
B. Innocent Spouse Relief 
Although innocent spouse relief has been available since 1971,102 Congress 
expanded its availability in RRA 1998, permitting relief in additional 
circumstances.103  “Innocent spouse” relief is based on the idea that, in certain 
cases, tax debts should not be collected from one spouse, even though joint and 
several liability exists.104  Like CDP, innocent spouse relief provides an 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition on actions to stop tax 
 
appropriate, the Federal district court.  Where the validity of the tax liability was properly 
at issue in the hearing, and where the determination with regard to the tax liability is a part 
of the appeal, no levy may take place during the pendency of the appeal.  The amount of 
the tax liability will in such cases be reviewed by the appropriate court on a de novo basis.  
Where the validity of the tax liability is not properly part of the appeal, the taxpayer may 
challenge the determination of the appeals officer for abuse of discretion.  In such cases, 
the appeals officer’s determination as to the appropriateness of collection activity will be 
reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard of review.  Levies will not be suspended 
during the appeal if the Secretary shows good cause why the levy should be allowed to 
proceed. 
Id. 
 100. Book, supra note 91, at 1194–97. 
 101. The possibility of bifurcated review created several potential problems.  First, multiple 
appeals could be required in a single case.  Second, inconsistent results could occur with respect 
to a single taxpayer and a single tax year.  Third, the tax collection process could be further 
slowed while waiting for two courts’ decisions.  Cords, The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 
supra note 91, at 1048–55. 
 102. Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971) (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
to provide that in certain cases a spouse will be relieved of liability arising from a joint income 
tax return). 
 103. Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 
685, 739–740 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6015); H. REP. NO. 105-599, at 249–55 (1998) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N 288, 288–95. 
 104. I.R.C. § 6015 (West Supp. 2007). 
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collection actions,105 permitting judicial review of a request for innocent 
spouse relief. 106 
RRA 1998 made innocent spouse relief available in three instances.  First, 
innocent spouse relief is available to a spouse if the following conditions exist: 
(1) a joint return was filed; (2) there is an understatement of tax attributable to 
the non-requesting spouse; (3) the requesting spouse did not know or have 
reason to know of the understatement; (4) holding the spouse liable for the tax 
would be inequitable; and (5) innocent spouse relief is requested no later than 
two years after the requesting spouse receives notice of the innocent spouse 
rights.107  Second, innocent spouse relief is available if: (1) the couple is no 
longer married; (2) the couple is legally separated, or has not lived together for 
twelve months prior to the request for innocent spouse relief; and (3) the 
spouse requesting relief did not actually know of the item giving rise to the 
liability when the return was signed.108  Third, innocent spouse relief is 
available under the equitable relief provisions if it would be inequitable to hold 
the taxpayer liable for the unpaid tax or deficiency under all of the facts and 
circumstances, and the taxpayer does not otherwise qualify for innocent spouse 
relief.109 
The Tax Court and the district court share jurisdiction over innocent 
spouse cases.  The Tax Court has jurisdiction over these cases if a deficiency 
has been asserted110 or the taxpayer has been denied equitable relief, regardless 
of the existence of a deficiency.111  The district courts have jurisdiction over 
innocent spouse determinations in tax refund cases.112  The Tax Court loses its 
jurisdiction to the extent that the district court or the United States Court of 
Federal Claims acquires jurisdiction over an innocent spouse claim.113 
The Tax Court conducts abuse of discretion review when it hears appeals 
from the Service’s denials of taxpayer’s requests for stand alone equitable 
innocent spouse relief.  There was some question as to whether the Tax Court 
had jurisdiction over stand alone requests for equitable relief in innocent 
spouse cases after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction over innocent spouse cases was limited to deficiency 
cases.114  The Tax Court ultimately agreed that it lacked jurisdiction over stand 
 
 105. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2007). 
 106. § 6015(e). 
 107. § 6015(b)(1). 
 108. § 6015(c)(3). 
 109. § 6015(f). 
 110. § 6015(e)(1). 
 111. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1).  Tax Court jurisdiction exists in cases arising and liabilities 
remaining unpaid after December 20, 2006. 
 112. Id. 
 113. § 6015(e)(3). 
 114. Ewing v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’g 122 T.C. 32 (2004). 
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alone innocent spouse cases in Billings v. Commissioner.115  However, in the 
Tax and Health Care Relief Act of 2006, Congress assured future access to the 
Tax Court for those making stand alone requests for equitable relief under the 
innocent spouse provisions.116  By amending Code section 6015(e), Congress 
ensured that the Tax Court had jurisdiction over requests for innocent spouse 
relief under section 6015(f), even if no deficiency was asserted.117 
In Ewing, the Tax Court explained: 
  The Tax Code has long provided a specific statutory framework for 
reviewing deficiency determinations of the Internal Revenue Service.  Section 
6015 is part and parcel of this statutory framework.  This Court’s de novo 
review procedures emanate from this statutory framework.  Accordingly, the 
APA judicial review procedures do not supplant this Court’s longstanding de 
novo review procedures in cases arising under section 6015. 
  Moreover, the fact that section 6015 postdates the APA does not render the 
APA judicial review procedures applicable here.  APA section 559 provides 
that the APA does “not limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by 
statute or otherwise recognized by law.”  When the APA was enacted in 1946, 
this Court’s de novo procedures for reviewing IRS functions were well 
established and “recognized by law” within the meaning of APA section 
559. . . .  These de novo trial procedures, which have remained essentially 
unchanged since the APA’s enactment, provide a stricter scope of review of 
the Commissioner’s determinations than would obtain under APA review 
procedures. Consequently, pursuant to APA section 559, the APA does not 
limit or repeal “additional requirements” arising from this Court’s de novo 
review procedures. 
. . . . 
  The mere fact that judicial review is for abuse of discretion in a spousal 
relief case arising under section 6015(f) does not trigger application of the 
APA record rule or preclude this Court from conducting a de novo trial.118 
 
 115. 127 T.C. 7 (2006).  On remand, following statutory revisions that gave the Tax Court 
jurisdiction, the Tax Court considered the case on the merits.  Billings v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 183 (2007). 
 116. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 408(a), 120 Stat. 2922, 
3061. 
 117. Id.  This grant of jurisdiction applies to cases arising with respect to unpaid liabilities in 
existence on December 20, 2006. 
 118. 122 T.C. at 52–53 (Thornton, J., concurring), rev’d, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(citations and footnotes omitted).  The Tax Court has reaffirmed its position that its review is not 
limited to the administrative record following the statutory grant of Tax Court jurisdiction in 
equitable relief cases brought for relief under section 6015(f).  Van Arsdalen v. Comm’r, 93 
T.C.M. (CCH) 953 (2007) (noting that it was not required to look outside the record to find an 
abuse of discretion in this case). 
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Here also, the Tax Court has refused to apply true abuse of discretion 
review.  This approach violates the congressional directive regarding judicial 
review, despite the fact that the Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.  In 
addition, “a stricter scope of review” as used by the Tax Court is likely to be 
slower and require more resources.  This impedes the tax collection process by 
slowing payment and using more court time and IRS and taxpayer resources. 
C. Interest Abatement 
Code section 6404(e) permits the Service to abate interest on certain tax 
liabilities if the interest accrued because of the Service’s failure to perform a 
ministerial act.  Although abatement is a discretionary function, taxpayers can 
request judicial review of the denial of a request for interest abatement in the 
Tax Court.119  The Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction in these cases.120  As in 
CDP and innocent spouse cases, judicial review is conducted for abuse of 
discretion.  Here, the Tax Court uses an approach to judicial review like that 
used in CDP and innocent spouse cases. 
The distinctions between the redetermination of a deficiency and judicial 
review of tax collection decisions, which involve judicial review of 
discretionary administrative decisions, will be more fully developed in Part IV 
of this Article.  First, the next section of this article will review the applicable 
principles of administrative law. 
III.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
This section begins with a brief description of the administrative law 
principles used during judicial review of agency decisions, and that should 
inform the courts’ review of tax collection decisions.  Next, it will consider 
how administrative law should apply to judicial review of tax collection 
decisions. 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act and Administrative Law Generally 
During the New Deal, as administrative agencies proliferated, Congress 
recognized that there were problems with agencies’ and courts’ use of 
inconsistent approaches to accomplish similar functions.  After much debate,121 
Congress adopted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946,122 which 
 
 119. I.R.C. § 6404(h) (West Supp. 2007).  The Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction in denials 
of a request for interest abatement under section 6404(e).  Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 
2011, 2015 (2007). 
 120. Hinck, 127 S. Ct. 2015. 
 121. 1 KOCH, supra note 59, § 2.31. 
 122. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2000)). 
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attempts to codify prior law and clarify ambiguities.123  The APA is applicable 
to all agency actions, unless the agency is specifically exempt from the 
APA,124 or there is a more specific rule in the governing statute.125 
Agencies include “each authority of the Government of the United States, 
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency.”126  The 
nature of courts’ activities necessarily exclude them from the APA’s definition 
of agencies.127 
In most instances, administrative agencies have great flexibility to 
determine how to do their work.  One of the overriding principles behind the 
APA rules is that the agency should be able to “exercise its administrative 
discretion in deciding how, in light of internal organizational considerations, it 
may best proceed to develop the needed evidence.”128  To guide their work, the 
APA sets the standards for agency actions, such as rulemaking, the conduct of 
hearings, and the performance of certain actions.129  In addition, a large body 
of administrative law provides guidance for agency actions when the APA is 
ambiguous or silent on an issue. 
Judicial review is preferred under the APA.  Under the APA, “[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled 
to judicial review thereof.”130  However, in most cases only final agency 
actions are reviewable.131  The APA directs courts to apply certain 
presumptions and standards of review when reviewing agency decisions and 
actions.132 
Despite the strong preference for judicial review of agency decisions, the 
APA recognizes that under certain circumstances judicial review is not 
appropriate.133  Among the circumstances that do not give rise to a right to 
 
 123. 1 KOCH, supra note 59, § 2.31. 
 124. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 275–79 (3d ed. 
1999).  No IRC provision specifically supersedes the requirements under APA § 553 providing 
for notice and comment rulemaking.  SALTZMAN, supra note 64, ¶ 1.03. 
 125. This is also referred to as the enabling act.  1 KOCH, supra note 59, § 2.30. 
 126. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000). 
 127. § 551(1)(B); § 701(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 128. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976); see 
also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544 
(1978). 
 129. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power, 435 U.S. at 545 (citing S. REP. NO. 752, at 
14–15 (1945) (legislative history of section 4 of the APA)). 
 130. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). 
 131. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.  A preliminary, 
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable . . . .”). 
 132. See generally § 701. 
 133. § 702. 
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judicial review are cases where judicial review is statutorily prohibited or the 
decision is clearly committed to agency discretion.134  However, these 
circumstances rarely occur.135 
Even after acknowledging the strong preference for judicial review, the 
courts have accepted the need for and approved limits to the availability of 
judicial review.136  For example, the separation of powers doctrine makes it 
more appropriate for the executive branch to set policy than the judicial 
branch.137  Under this view, deference is often afforded to the agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.138  One of the most important factors in 
determining whether the agency acted within its authority is whether formal 
adjudication, with much more rigorous procedures than informal adjudication, 
was required.  Formal versus informal proceedings are discussed in the 
following section.  The end of the section discusses the appropriate scope of 
judicial review of an agency decision. 
1. Formal Versus Informal Agency Adjudication 
Formal adjudications are conducted by agencies using trial-like 
procedures.  These proceedings are more time consuming and resource 
intensive than informal adjudication.  Formal adjudication is necessary only 
when specifically required by statute.139  As the name suggests, informal 
adjudications are usually much less trial-like than is typical of formal agency 
 
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the 
court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable 
ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to 
suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. 
Id. 
 134. § 701(a). 
 135. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 354, 410 (1971); S. REP. NO. 
752, at 26 (1945). 
 136. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 827–31 (1985). 
 137. 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 12.12. 
 138. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(creating two-step analysis for determining the permissibility of an agency interpretation).  A 
number of cases have since considered and explained how and when this approach applies.  See 
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 139. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2000); PIERCE ET AL., supra note 124, at 298 (formal adjudication is 
required where the “adjudication [is] required by statute to be determined on the record after an 
opportunity for an agency hearing . . .” (quoting 5.U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000))).  Formal adjudication 
by an agency is procedurally similar to a trial.  Under the APA, during formal adjudication (1) the 
agency must provide an impartial decision-maker; (2) the party must be given notice of the 
proceedings, a right to be represented, and an opportunity to make arguments and present 
evidence orally; (3) the party must have a right to cross-examine opposing witnesses and know 
about opposing evidence; (4) the resolution of factual disputes must be based solely on the 
evidence presented at the adjudication; and (5) there must be written findings and conclusions.  5 
U.S.C. §§ 554–556 (2000). 
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adjudication.140  The lessened formality provides the advantage of allowing 
faster, less expensive, individual action on specific issues.  Informal 
adjudications may also be more flexible.  If the agency’s governing statute 
does not require formal adjudication, the agency may use informal 
adjudication.141 
For a variety of reasons, including flexibility and rapid resolution of the 
issues, most agency actions use informal rather than formal procedures.142  
Notwithstanding that most agency actions are informal, the APA provides 
limited guidance regarding the conduct of informal adjudications; the only 
section directly applicable to the procedure for informal adjudications deals 
with “Ancillary Matters.”143  However, many courts have considered the 
adequacy of informal administrative hearings and significant commentary has 
attempted to develop the appropriate standards for informal agency actions.144 
Because of the strong preference for judicial review, the courts usually will 
review a final decision made during either formal or informal agency 
proceedings.145  In most cases, judicial review of an agency action is available 
only to determine whether the action or decision of the agency was an abuse of 
discretion or was “arbitrary” and “capricious.”146  Many courts have concluded 
that following informal adjudication, the standard to be applied is whether the 
decision was arbitrary.147  The nature and scope of the court’s review depends 
 
 140. 1 KOCH, supra note 59, § 2.13. 
 141. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 124, at 276–77, 342–43. 
 142. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post 
and Ex Ante Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2004) 
(“[O]ver ninety percent of agency actions constitute ‘informal adjudication.’”). 
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 555; see also Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the 
APA’s Adjudication Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1003 (2004) (advocating extending the APA’s adjudication provisions to a variety of 
situations not currently covered). 
 144. See, e.g., Richard McMillan, Jr. & Todd D. Peterson, The Permissible Scope of 
Hearings, Discovery, and Additional Fact-Finding During Judicial Review of Informal Agency 
Action, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333 (1982); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a 
Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61 (1997); Thomas O. Sargentich, 
The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 599 (1997); Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit 
the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1984); Gordon G. 
Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The 
Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement of Judicial Review “On the 
Record,” 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179 (1996).  This is by no means a comprehensive list of 
articles discussing the appropriate role of the courts that review informal agency action; it is 
merely meant as a sample of the writings in this area.  See also 1 KOCH, supra note 59, §§ 2, 4, 5. 
 145. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414–15, 419–20 (1971). 
 146. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 147. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 770 F.2d 386, 389 (4th 
Cir. 1985); 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 10.4. 
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primarily on the issue under review, not on the type of procedure the agency 
used.148 
2. Abuse of Discretion 
Among the standards that are applied to review of agency actions is abuse 
of discretion.  This standard is commonly applied when the agency is granted 
discretion in the performance of its duties.  In these cases, the court does not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.149  Rather, the court considers 
whether the decision made by the agency was within the proper range of 
decisions it could make and was based on consideration of adequate and proper 
evidence; that is, the decision was not an abuse of discretion. 
During abuse of discretion review courts conduct a “thorough, probing, in-
depth review” of the record.150  “Although this inquiry into the facts is to be 
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.  The 
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”151  
This protects the participant and the agency’s independence. 
Many formulations of abuse of discretion have been used.  Abuse of 
discretion has been equated with an action that was arbitrary, capricious, or 
clearly erroneous.152  Other definitions have also been used.  The court must 
determine the agency’s discretion and whether its decision is an abuse of that 
discretion.153 
 
 148. However, challenges can and have been made when a participant wants or is entitled to a 
formal proceeding, but receives only informal procedures.  Similarly, many cases have challenged 
the adequacy of informal procedures in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 
U.S. 129 (1991). 
 149. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. 
 150. Id. at 415. 
 151. Id. at 416. 
 152. Sutton v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 885 F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(citing Frigsby v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985)); 
Perez-Alvarez v. INS, 857 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1988); Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384, 
1387 (7th Cir. 1987); 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 10.6[1]; Ronald Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine 
Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 292 (1986). 
 153. 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 10.6; Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next 
Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1491–93 (1983). 
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3. Record Review 
To facilitate judicial review, even under the very deferential standards of 
abuse of discretion or arbitrariness, an agency must create a record that 
supports the agency’s action.  An administrative record is required even in an 
informal adjudication.154  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that while 
justification of an agency decision is important, it is also important not to turn 
informal agency proceedings into formal agency adjudications or 
rulemakings.155  A tension is created by the need to create a record and also to 
permit agencies to use less formal procedures.  The development of the record 
is important because of the reliance courts place on the record when reviewing 
agency actions. 
During abuse of discretion review, little independent fact-finding is 
required.  When a court relies on the information developed by the agency, it is 
said to use “review on the record.”156  During review on the record, the court 
looks at the record created by the agency to determine whether the agency’s 
action was within its discretion.  This review requires the court to determine 
whether, on the record, the agency’s action can be justified.  Courts are 
directed to “review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and 
due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”157  To permit this 
type of review, the agency must create a record. 
A complete record, including transcript, is not created during most 
informal hearings, although a record is created.158  The official record of an 
informal adjudication may not be clearly defined, but usually includes 
correspondence, file notes, and records reviewed during the hearing.159  To 
protect participants, the APA provides that 
 
 154. 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 11.2. 
 155. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
547–48 (1978) (“[A]gencies, operating under [a] vague injunction to employ the ‘best’ 
procedures and facing the threat of reversal if they did not, would undoubtedly adopt full 
adjudicatory procedures in every instance.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 145 (1973). 
 156. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); Young, 
supra note 144, at 213.  Because of the rule of record review, often at issue during judicial review 
is what constitutes the record.  Id. at 208.  The record is generally comprised of all of the 
documents and information considered by the hearing officer in making a decision.  Overton 
Park, 401 U.S. at 419–20  (reviewing court considers the decisions in light of “the full 
administrative record that was before [the agency decision maker] at the time he made his 
decision”). 
 157. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
 158. See generally Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“The APA 
specifically contemplates judicial review on the basis of the agency record compiled in the course 
of an informal agency action in which a hearing has not occurred.”). 
 159. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.2 (2001). 
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Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written 
application, petition, or other request of an interest person made in connection 
with any agency proceedings.  Except in affirming a prior denial or when the 
denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement 
of the grounds for denial.160 
Thus, the hearing officer must justify the decision, which is part of the 
administrative record.161 
Even when a court concludes that the agency erred, under the rule of 
prejudicial error, the court must consider whether the error was prejudicial to 
the outcome.162  This rule, which is akin to the rule of harmless error used by 
the courts of appeals,163 directs the reviewing court to consider whether any 
errors during a hearing or the creation of the record prejudiced the decision164 
but provides for no remedy if no prejudice resulted from the error.165 
When the record is inadequate to permit the necessary review of the 
agency’s decision the court can remand the case to the agency to supplement 
the record.166  “[T]he proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand 
to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”167  Alternatively, the 
court may accept additional evidence to complete the record.168  However, 
even when the record is inadequate, the court is not to substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency except when trial de novo is permitted.169  Often, 
therefore, additional evidence is used to bolster the agency’s decision. 
Review on the record is not without teeth; a decision will not be upheld 
unless it is supported by the record, requiring the agency to support its decision 
 
 160. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000). 
 161. Id. 
 162. § 706; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 10.7. 
 163. See, e.g., Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 269 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 
2001) (“The doctrine of harmless error is as much a part of judicial review of administrative 
action as of appellate review of trial court judgments.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 3 
KOCH, supra note 59, § 10.7. 
 165. 3 KOCH, supra note 59, § 10.7. 
 166. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985). 
 167. Id. at 744; see also United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 718 (1963). 
 168. McMillan & Peterson, supra note 144, at 334. 
 169. 3 KOCH, supra note 59, §§ 10.1, 10.2.  Some commentators have suggested that the 
debates about the appropriate scope of the record in individual cases have essentially caused the 
exceptions to swallow the rule.  Stark & Wald, supra note 144, at 343–44 (identifying eight 
categories of exceptions that have been judicially created to the rule of on the record review).  But 
see, Young, supra note 144, at 219–29 (critiquing Stark and Wald’s conclusions).  The exceptions 
to the record rule that courts have used to remedy administrative failings do not entirely 
eviscerate the rule of record review.  Id. at 218–19. 
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with facts.170  Both the rule of record review and the rule of prejudicial error 
further the principle that the agency should be making the policy decisions 
delegated to it by Congress, not the courts.171 
B. Administrative Law 
1. In General 
The IRS is an agency under the APA definition and is not specifically 
exempt from the application of the APA.172  Notwithstanding the fact that 
some of its actions are exempt from the APA and judicial review, the APA is 
still applicable to many IRS actions and decisions.173  However, administrative 
law, like other areas that overlap, is often overlooked in the context of tax 
proceedings.174 
During the drafting and adoption of the APA, most of those involved 
believe that tax cases would not be subject to administrative law.  In fact, the 
recommendations regarding administrative procedure in the Attorney 
General’s report in 1946 stated that review of tax liabilities would not be 
subject to the APA.175  At that time, in 1946, tax litigation was permitted only 
for pre-assessment deficiency redeterminations and post-payment refund 
suits.176  Challenges to unpaid tax liabilities were limited to proceedings before 
the BTA, which remained an executive agency, subject to review by the circuit 
courts of appeals, and suits for refund.177  There was no post-assessment, pre-
payment opportunity for a judicial challenge to an IRS collection decision.  
 
 170. But see Krotoszynski, supra note 142, at 1060 (“[W]ith the possible exception of 
procedural due process claims, this feedback loop is an imperfect mechanism for ensuring fair 
process in the first instance.”). 
 171. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 172. SALTZMAN, supra note 64, ¶1.03. 
 173. Id.  As discussed below, such exclusions include courts, including the Tax Court.  See 
infra Part IV.B. 
 174. SALTZMAN, supra note 64, ¶1.03. 
 175. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REPORT ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945) (noting that “the tax functions of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue (which are triable de novo in The Tax Court)” are exempt from the 
APA); S. REP. NO. 752 (1945) (APA adjudication provisions are not applicable when a court will 
make a de novo finding, providing as an example “tax assessments . . . not made upon an 
administrative hearing and record, [where] contests may involve a trial of the facts in the Tax 
Court”).  See generally H.R. REP. NO. 1980 (1946) (discussing legislative history and substance 
of the APA). 
 176. See generally supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Tax Court’s 
expanded jurisdiction over time). 
 177. See generally supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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Sovereign immunity, coupled with the Anti-Injunction Act, barred all suits to 
stop the assessment or collection of taxes.178 
The IRS and the Treasury Department acknowledge the applicability of the 
APA and administrative law in some situations.  For example, when the 
Treasury issues regulations it usually uses a notice and comment procedure.  
Notice and comment rulemaking is often used to promulgate “interpretive 
regulations,” which are exempt from the notice and comment requirements.179 
There are many situations where the APA is inapplicable as well.  The 
Anti-Injunction Act broadly prohibits judicial intervention in many of the 
Service’s decisions.180  In addition, the notice and comment process is not used 
to issue temporary regulations or revenue procedures.181  Moreover, many IRS 
actions do not involve rulemaking or adjudication, including the issuance of 
informal guidance and determination of tax liabilities.182 
The APA is not applicable to judicial review of an agency decision when a 
court is authorized to conduct a trial de novo.183  In most instances, application 
of administrative law is unnecessary because the taxpayer is entitled to seek de 
novo review of the question later.  Thus, the APA does not apply in deficiency 
 
 178. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (2006).  However, the use of the term “interpretive 
regulation” in tax is often distinguishable from its use in administrative law.  See generally Steve 
R. Johnson, Swallows As It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law, 112 TAX NOTES 
773 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Swallows As It Might Have Been]; Steve R. Johnson, Swallows 
Holding As It Is: The Distortion of  National Muffler, 112 TAX NOTES 351 (2006) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Swallows Holding As It Is]. 
 180. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2000). 
 181. Some commentators have argued that the notice and comment procedures should be used 
even in many of these cases.  See e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 2081, 2095–02 (2005); Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of 
Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524 (1977); Michael Asimow, 
Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 344 
(1991). 
 182. Examples of informal guidance include Technical Advice Memoranda, Revenue 
Rulings, and Revenue Procedures, all of which may be challenged in a deficiency or refund case 
and are often viewed only as the Service’s litigating position, rather than statements of law.  
Peracchi v. Comm’r, 143 F.3d 487, 492 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A revenue ruling is entitled to 
some deference as the stated litigating position of the agency which enforces the tax code, but not 
nearly as much as a regulation.”); McLaulin v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 255, 263 (2000) (“We 
generally treat a revenue ruling as merely the Commissioner’s litigating position not entitled to 
any judicial deference or precedential weight.”).  However, the existence of such guidance may 
be used by a taxpayer to avoid penalties under the theory that there is substantial authority for a 
reporting position based on the existence of such guidance.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (2006). 
 183. Examples include deficiency redeterminations by the Tax Court under I.R.C. § 6213 and 
refund cases under I.R.C. § 7422 in the district courts and 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) in the United 
States Court of Federal Claims. 
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and refund cases.184  Both the Tax Court and the district court conduct de novo 
review. 
Notwithstanding the direction to or expectation that the Tax Court will use 
abuse of discretion review, the Tax Court has refused to consult administrative 
law in the context of CDP determination appeals185 and denials of innocent 
spouse relief.186  Interestingly, despite its statements pertaining to the 
inapplicability of the APA in cases before it, the Tax Court recognizes the 
application of the APA in some, but not all, non-collection circumstances.187 
The intersection of tax and administrative law outside the rulemaking 
context has received relatively little consideration by scholars.188  In recent 
years, that trend has started to change.189  Some commentators have suggested 
that tax is unique and the review of collection decisions should be performed 
differently than the decisions of other agencies.190  Other commentators have 
pointed out that tax is no more technical than other areas that are regulated by 
 
 184. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2000) (providing that the 
APA is inapplicable where de novo review is provided, “[e]xcept to the extent that prior, 
adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is 
subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement”). 
 185. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455, 459–62 (8th Cir. 
2006); Johnson v. Comm’r, No. 20594-03S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-47, 2005 WL 883701 (U.S. 
Tax Ct. Apr. 18, 2005) (rejecting the Service’s contention that the APA’s judicial review 
provisions governed review of the CDP determination); Vierow v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-
255 (2004) (rejecting the taxpayers claim that the APA should limit review to the administrative 
record noting that “[i]n Robinette, we held that when reviewing the Commissioner’s 
determination pursuant to section 6330, our review is not limited by the Administrative Procedure 
Act, the evidence we may consider is not limited to the administrative record, and we conduct 
trials de novo”); Armstrong v. Comm’r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 287, 291–92 (2002) (concluding that 
I.R.C. section 6330 did not require a formal hearing under the APA, as well as not requiring an 
informal face-to-face hearing); Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162, 172–74 (2002) (majority 
opinion fails to address APA issues raised by Judge Halpern’s concurring opinion); Lunsford v. 
Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 167–69 (2001) (majority opinion fails even to acknowledge discussion of 
the applicability of the APA raised by Judge Halpern’s concurrence).   
 186. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 35–36 (2004), rev’d on jurisdictional grounds, 439 F.3d 
1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 187.  Mailman v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 1079, 1082–83 (1988); Estate of Gardner v. Comm’r, 82 
T.C. 989, 994 (1984); Dittler Bros., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 896, 909–10 (1979), aff’d without 
published opinion, 642 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 188. Book, supra note 91, at 1159. 
 189. Id.; see also Johnson, Swallows Holding As It Is, supra note 179; Johnson, Swallows As 
It Might Have Been, supra note 179; see generally Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the 
Supreme Court?, 84 B. U. L. REV. 185 (2004) (arguing that Treasury check-the-box regulations 
are invalid in light of Supreme Court precedent, and, therefore, Chevron deference is irrelevant). 
 190. John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the 
Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995). 
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administrative agencies.191  In addition, courts specialize in the interpretation 
of statutes.192  Increasingly commentators are calling for tax law to embrace 
the legal principles commonly applied to other areas of law.193  Despite the 
Tax Court’s unwillingness to apply administrative law in the review of tax 
collection decisions,194 the IRS has taken the position that it should be applied 
in these cases.195 
Common standards of review develop a widely understood meaning from 
frequent use.  That certainty is reduced or eliminated when courts use common 
formulations in uncommon ways.  “The standard of review adopted by the Tax 
Court does not fit within the customary matrix inasmuch as it uses non-
traditional terms to define a standard of review.  By not applying terminology 
with which courts interact frequently, consistency in the application of a 
standard of review is not possible.”196  Thus, the unusual use the Tax Court 
makes of the abuse of discretion standard has potential adverse systematic 
consequences. 
In many tax collection cases, the Tax Court must determine whether the 
Service abused its discretion.  As with other courts and agency decisions, the 
issue is not whether the Tax Court would arrive at the same conclusion.197  
Whether there is an abuse of discretion is a very different question than is 
presented by the determination of the correct liability.  Moreover, there are 
instances where the Code specifically directs the Tax Court to review for abuse 
of discretion.198  This congressional direction places the Tax Court in the same 
position as the district courts during the review of discretionary administrative 
decisions.199  When it conducts a de novo trial in this situation, the Tax Court 
is acting outside its jurisdictional grant.200 
 
 191. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial 
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1598–1600 (2006). 
 192. Id. at 1542.  Other scholars have criticized the tendency of tax professionals, scholars, 
and judges to view tax as a law unto itself.  See generally Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax 
Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 637 (1996); Caron, supra note 75; Lederman, supra note 75. 
 193. Book, supra note 91, at 1148–49. 
 194. See supra note text accompanying note 185. 
 195. Vierow v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-255 (2004) (taxpayer argued on brief that the 
CDP provisions were governed by the APA). 
 196. Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 12. 
 197. I.R.C. §§ 6015(e), 6330(d)(1), 6404(h)(1) (West Supp. 2007); Washington v. Comm’r, 
120 T.C. 137, 146 (2003); Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). 
 198. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6404(i). 
 199. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 200. I.R.C. § 6404(i). 
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The Tax Court acknowledges that abuse of discretion review is required in 
innocent spouse, interest abatement, and collection due process appeals.201  
However, the Tax Court has concluded that it is not required to apply 
administrative law, the APA, or the rule of record review.202  In these cases, 
the Tax Court often conducts a careful review of the facts present both at the 
hearing and at trial, rather than limiting its inquiry to the permissibility of the 
conclusion reached on the evidence available to the Service.203  As a result of 
its approach, the Tax Court is not performing traditional abuse of discretion 
review.  This risks diluting or undermining the commonly understood meaning 
of abuse of discretion review. 
The Tax Court has expressly rejected contentions relating to application of 
administrative law, concluding that rather than limiting its review to the 
administrative record, it is free to supplement the administrative record 
liberally.204  The Tax Court has stated that even when reviewing for abuse of 
discretion it conducts de novo review.205  Notwithstanding the Tax Court’s 
refusal to be limited in its inquiry by the rule of record review, the Tax Court 
also refuses, in most circumstances, to consider issues not present at the 
hearing.206  This position is somewhat inconsistent with limited review.  
However, the Tax Court bases its conclusion on its reading of its jurisdiction to 
review the appeals office’s determination.207 
Moreover, the Tax Court has also refused to apply the judicial review 
standards found in APA section 706.208  Even when it applies an abuse of 
discretion standard, the Tax Court’s review more closely resembles a trial de 
 
 201. I.R.C. § 6404(i) (permitting the Tax Court to review denials of interest abatement for 
abuse of discretion); Washington, 120 T.C. at 146 (concluding that to prevail on an appeal of a 
denial of innocent spouse relief on equitable grounds under I.R.C. § 6015(f) the Service must 
have abused its discretion); Sego, 114 T.C. at 609–10 (concluding that, consistent with the 
legislative history, CDP cases are to be reviewed for abuse of discretion unless the underlying 
liability is at issue). 
 202. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006); see 
also Giamelli v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 107, 117 (2007) (Wherry, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘record’ in a 
section 6320 and/or section 6330 case is not sacrosanct.”). 
 203. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 101. 
 204. Id. at 95 (“[W]e hold that, when reviewing for abuse of discretion under section 6330(d), 
we are not limited by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and our review is not limited to 
the administrative record.”); see also Fisher v. United States, 45 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 205. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 38–39, rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 206. Giamelli, 129 T.C. 107, 112–13 (majority opinion); Magana v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 488, 
493 (2002). 
 207. Giamelli, 129 T.C. 107, 112–13. 
 208. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 95–96. 
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novo than a deferential review of an agency decision.209  Rather than applying 
the expected deference, de novo review encourages the court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the Service.  Although the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the Tax Court’s conclusion that it did not have to apply the APA or 
conduct record review in CDP cases, the Tax Court could continue to use its 
traditional approach in all other circuits.210 
By expanding the scope of review beyond the administrative record, the 
Tax Court may uphold decisions that would otherwise constitute an abuse of 
discretion.  For instance, in a number of cases the Tax Court has concluded 
that even though the appeals office had not conducted a hearing, remanding for 
a hearing was not necessary because it would not be productive.211  Because a 
hearing is required by statute before issuance of a CDP determination, this 
seems an abuse of discretion that would require remand.212  The Tax Court also 
has been willing to view compliance with the verification requirements 
broadly.213  For example, the Tax Court has upheld a CDP determination, 
 
 209. Book, supra note 91, at 1173–74, 1194–97 (2004) (“[T]he proceedings closely resemble 
other Tax Court proceedings that are completed on a de novo basis.”); see also Camp, The 
Failure of CDP, Part 2, supra note 91. 
 210. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 465 (8th Cir. 2006).  The Tax Court follows its own 
precedent in subsequent cases raising the same issue, unless the appellate jurisdiction lies with a 
Circuit Court of Appeals that has concluded that the Tax Court’s approach is incorrect.  Golsen v. 
Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).  At that time, the Tax Court may choose to reconsider its 
approach, but will continue to follow its precedent in other circuits unless and until it reverses its 
prior holding.  Id.; see also Bowman v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1204, 1207 (2007) (noting 
that appeal would lie in the Eighth Circuit, but stating the Tax Court “shall follow Robinette in 
the instant case only if that opinion is squarely in point.”).  But see NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, 2006 REPORT, supra note 3, at 573 (suggesting that the reversal in Robinette would 
likely eliminate the Tax Court’s refusal to apply the rule of record review). 
 211. See, e.g., Leggett v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 553 (2006); Sapp v. Comm’r, 91 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1177, 1181 (2006); Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 169, 173 (2001).  This does not 
seem analogous to cases where the decision is fully committed to agency discretion.  See Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1984).  In those cases, no review is available.  In these cases, judicial 
review is specifically permitted.  Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011, 2015 (2007); see also 
Fisher v. United States, 45 F.3d 396, 397 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing the Tax Court’s conclusion 
that the Commissioner had not abused her discretion because there was no evidence supporting 
the denial of a waiver of penalties). 
 212. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33. 
  [S]uch a decision has traditionally been “committed to agency discretion,” . . . [W]e 
emphasize that the decision is only presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be 
rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in 
exercising its enforcement powers. . . .  Congress did not set agencies free to disregard 
legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers. 
Id. 
 213. See Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162, 167 (2002) (concluding that the petitioner was not 
prejudiced when he was provided with the verification of assessment prior to trial, even if not at 
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despite the appeals officer’s conclusion that all statutory and regulatory 
requirements were met, though the taxpayer requested proof of assessment, 
which was not provided until after the CDP hearing.214  In addition, the Tax 
Court has concluded that it is permitted to receive additional evidence not 
included in the administrative record to determine whether the taxpayer was 
entitled to reinstatement of his offer-in-compromise.215  Although in Robinette 
the taxpayer had attempted to present the evidence to the appeals officer, the 
Tax Court could have used other approaches, including a remand to the appeals 
office.  In these cases the Tax Court may be substituting its judgment for that 
of the appeals officer, despite the applicability of the abuse of discretion 
review.  This approach may reduce the common understanding of abuse of 
discretion review.  However, the Tax Court seems to recognize at least some of 
the potential pitfalls.  To prevent abuse of the CDP hearing process, the Tax 
Court has limited the additional evidence it will receive to evidence offered to 
and refused by the appeals officer.  The Tax Court will not consider an issue 
that was not raised at an administrative hearing.216  This limitation is intended 
to prevent a taxpayer or adviser from holding back an issue during the appeals 
proceeding and saving it for the case during judicial review.217  Such holdbacks 
would make the process much less conclusive and more time consuming.  
Moreover, the Tax Court has held that it is without jurisdiction to consider 
issues not raised during the hearing.218  However, a dissent in Giamelli v. 
Commissioner argued that the jurisdictional grant permitted the court to review 
“matters” rather than “determinations.”219  Judge Swift felt that the use of the 
term “matters” was important.  He noted that the issue was the underlying 
liability and the legislative history was consistent with his interpretation 
anticipating de novo review.220 
The majority applied the regulations which were narrower, permitting 
review only of issues raised by the taxpayer at the hearing.221  In response, 
Judge Swift’s dissent raised the concern that the majority’s position might limit 
 
the hearing).  The appeals officer must verify compliance with the applicable law and regulations.  
I.R.C. § 6330(c) (West Supp. 2007). 
 214. Nestor, 118 T.C. at 166–67, 179–80 (holding no abuse of discretion despite the 
requirement of Treas. Reg. § 301.6203-1 that, if requested, the Service must provide a copy of the 
Assessment to the taxpayer).  The Service agrees with this conclusion.  Rev. Rul. 2007-21, 2007-
14 I.R.B. 865, 866. 
 215. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 216. Murphy v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 301, 315 (2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Magana v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002). 
 217. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 114–15 (Well, J., concurring). 
 218. Giamelli v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 107, 113 (2007). 
 219. Id. at 120 (Swift, J., dissenting).  This dissent was joined by four other judges.  Id. at 
124. 
 220. Id. at 120.   
 221. Id. at 116 (majority opinion). 
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the court’s ability to remand a case to appeals to consider an issue that the 
taxpayer had not previously raised at the hearing.222 
The district courts, on the other hand, have consistently applied traditional 
abuse of discretion review to CDP determinations when there were no properly 
raised challenges to the underlying liability.  The district courts have been 
unwilling to substitute their judgment for that of the appeals office.223  The 
courts of appeals have approved of this more limited review, acknowledging 
the need to limit review to prevent unnecessary judicial interference with the 
tax collection system.224  Courts have repeatedly noted that “without a clear 
abuse of discretion in the sense of clear taxpayer abuse and unfairness by the 
IRS, as contemplated by Congress, the judiciary will inevitably become 
involved on a daily basis with tax enforcement details that judges are neither 
qualified, nor have the time, to administer.”225   
Even in light of increased taxpayer rights, hampering tax collection 
unnecessarily would have an adverse effect on the tax collection system.  The 
posture and context under which tax collection cases enter the judicial system 
make the limited availability of a challenge to the underlying liability in 
taxpayers’ best interests.  However, another dissent in Giamelli argued that, 
“Congress knew that proceedings in Tax Court would be conducted de 
novo.”226  Giamelli highlights one of the challenges that the Tax Court faces 
when addressing tax collection cases.  Its history as a pre-payment forum may 
mean that it is much more comfortable as a finder of fact than it is providing 
oversight of administrative processes.  This tension seems to be illustrated by 
the tension in the dissents between the ideas that Congress would expect de 
novo fact-finding and that the majority might be limiting the court’s ability to 
order remand.  If de novo fact-finding is warranted or necessary, remand 
should not be.  If remand is appropriate, as it would be in many instances using 
traditional abuse of discretion review, then de novo fact-finding would not be 
appropriate. 
Post-assessment, the focus is necessarily on collection.  CDP hearings slow 
the judicial process, but should not be allowed to bring the tax collection 
system to a halt.  As a result, CDP proceedings are not an appropriate forum to 
determine the liability; the time and resources necessary to fully develop the 
case are not available.  Moreover, if no deficiency case was conducted, the 
taxpayer is entitled to make a refund claim after payment or collection.  
Rushing through evidence collection and determination of the tax liability in 
 
 222. Id. at 123–24 (Swift, J., dissenting).   
 223. Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); Living Care Alternatives of 
Utica v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 224. Olsen, 414 F.3d at 150; Living Care Alternatives, 411 F.3d at 625. 
 225. Living Care Alternatives, 411 F.3d at 631. 
 226. Giamelli v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 107, 127 (2007) (Vasquez, J., dissenting). 
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court ultimately does not serve the best interest of either the taxpayer or the 
government. 
The district courts have more experience conducting abuse of discretion 
review than does the Tax Court.  Since the rise of the administrative state, the 
district courts have often been called upon to conduct abuse of discretion 
review of the actions and decisions of many different agencies.  This additional 
experience may make district court judges more comfortable conducting abuse 
of discretion review.  On the other hand, the Tax Court’s historical jurisdiction, 
making deficiency redeterminations, has asked the judge only to arrive at the 
“right” result.227  There is a risk that observers and taxpayers may conclude 
that a failure to conduct abuse of discretion review in tax collection cases 
makes the process more result driven in the Tax Court.  Perceptions of this 
nature can be detrimental to effective tax collection as it may encourage more 
appeals and, therefore, may reduce the perception of fairness of the system.228 
The Tax Court’s failure to consider the rules of administrative law as used 
by the district courts in this area has resulted in inconsistent results to similarly 
situated taxpayers, in contravention of the norms and goals of sound tax 
policy.229  In addition, the difference in approach by the district court and the 
Tax Court could lead to inconsistency within cases of concurrent or 
overlapping jurisdiction. 
When reviewing tax collection decisions for abuse of discretion, special 
knowledge of the Tax Code and Regulations is generally unnecessary.230  
 
 227. See Fredkin v. Comm’r, 870 F.2d 801, 804 (1st Cir. 1989); Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. 
Comm’r, 508 F.2d 1096, 1102 (5th Cir. 1975); Abegg v. Comm’r, 429 F.2d 1209, 1218 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
 228. Curtis J. Berger, “Voluntary” Self-Assessment? The Unwilling Extraction of Taxpayer 
Information, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 759 n.3 (1981) (noting perceptions of cheating affecting 
compliance); Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and 
Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1021 (2003) (noting a correlation between declines 
in IRS enforcement and taxpayer compliance); Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A 
Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 378–80 (2002) 
(discussing how perceptions of cheating on taxes affect compliance). 
 229. Book, supra note 91, at 1161; Richard A. Musgrave, Equity and the Case for 
Progressive Taxation, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 9 (2002) (noting that the 
desirability of horizontal equity is “hardly debatable”). 
 230. In contrast, in other areas of substantive tax law, specialized knowledge is often 
required, or at least desirable.  See, e.g., Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964). 
  The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of subchapter K 
present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without the 
expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is 
sophisticated in tax matters with many years of experience in the tax field.  If there should 
be any lingering doubt on this matter one has only to reread [I.R.C.] section 736 . . . and 
give an honest answer to the question whether it is reasonably comprehensible to the 
average lawyer or even to the average tax expert who has not given special attention and 
extended study to the tax problems of partners.  Surely, a statute has not achieved 
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Unless the underlying liability is at  issue, the question presented to the court is 
whether the appeals officer abused her discretion.  A court must understand 
what constitutes an abuse of discretion.  This standard is widely used to 
determine whether the agency acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound 
basis in fact or law.”231  Without a common understanding of the standard, 
proper action can become unclear to both actors and courts.232 
Abuse of discretion review generally requires a determination of whether 
the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.  This determination 
can and should be made on the available record.  As in most tax matters, the 
taxpayer has the burden of proof. 233  If the record is inadequate, remand may 
be necessary.  In many cases, remand to the appeals office to complete the 
record will be preferable to the court accepting evidence and substituting its 
judgment for that of the appeals officer.  De novo review, accepting new 
evidence, and adding to the administrative record should be limited to cases 
where the underlying liability is properly at issue.234  However, the underlying 
liability is rarely at issue during tax collection cases.235  In other cases, the 
taxpayer has either had (and may even have taken advantage of) an opportunity 
to challenge the liability in a deficiency proceeding.  If the tax is paid without 
challenge to the underlying liability the taxpayer can still make a claim for 
refund. 
2. In the Collection Context 
Significant limits on judicial interference with tax collection are necessary 
to prevent the tax collection system from screeching to a halt.  Before RRA 
1998, decisions regarding how to collect previously assessed taxes were almost 
entirely committed to the Service’s discretion.236  Not only was there no waiver 
of sovereign immunity, but the Anti-Injunction Act barred suits to prevent tax 
assessment or collection “[e]xcept as [otherwise] provided.”237  
Notwithstanding very narrow exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 
 
“simplicity” when its complex provisions may confidently be dealt with by at most only a 
comparatively small number of specialists who have been initiated into its mysteries. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 231. Woodral v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 12, at 3.  In another context within the Tax Court, 
Professor Pietruszkiewicz takes the position that “[s]tandards of review should be limited to a 
familiar set of traditional review mechanisms.”  Id. at 2. 
 234. Some commentators have urged that the opportunity to challenge the underlying liability 
during the CDP process be reduced or eliminated altogether.  See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE SERV., IRS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS  (2005). 
 235. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (West Supp. 2007). 
 236. Book, supra note 91, at 1165. 
 237. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2000). 
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administrative law could inform and improve the fairness, effectiveness, and 
efficiency of judicial review in tax collection cases, which is more frequently 
available after RRA 1998.238 
In several cases, a majority of the Tax Court has justified its use of de novo 
review in CDP239 and innocent spouse cases240 by considering its approach to 
deficiency cases.  The majority opinion in Ewing v. Commissioner attempted to 
explain the Tax Court’s approach: 
  The legislative history of the APA confirms this understanding.  See S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Administrative Procedure Act 
(Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative 
History, 1944–46, at 22 (1946) (stating that there are exempted from APA 
formal adjudication requirements matters that are subject to de novo review of 
facts and law such “as the tax functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
(which are triable de novo in The Tax Court)”); S. Rept. 752, 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1945), reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History, 
1944–46, at 214 (1946) (explaining that pursuant to APA provisions governing 
the scope of judicial review, courts establish facts de novo where the agency 
adjudication is not subject to APA formal adjudication provisions “such as tax 
assessments . . . not made upon an administrative hearing and record, [where] 
contests may involve a trial of the facts in the Tax Court”); H. Rept. 1980, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative 
History, 1944–46, at 279 (1946) (same).241 
However, this opinion does not properly distinguish between the nature of 
the judicial inquiry required in deficiency cases and that are required in tax 
collection cases.  Instead of focusing on the review required, the majority 
focused on the approach that the Tax Court has used in other cases where the 
standard of review is for abuse of discretion.242  In doing so, the majority 
 
 238. See generally Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162, 172–74 (2002) (Halpern, J., concurring); 
Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 166–175 (2001) (Halpern, J., concurring).  For a discussion 
on applying the APA to the conduct of CDP hearings, see generally Cords, How Much Process is 
Due?, supra note 91. 
 239. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 97–98 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 240. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 37 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 241. Id. at 53 (Thornton, J., concurring). 
 242. Id. at 39–40. 
  Examples of actions in which we conduct a trial de novo are whether it was an abuse 
of discretion for the Commissioner to (1) determine that a taxpayer’s method of 
accounting did not clearly reflect income under section 446; (2) reallocate income or 
deductions under section 482; (3) fail to waive penalties and additions to tax; (4) refuse to 
abate interest under section 6404; (5) refuse to grant the taxpayer's request for an 
extension of time to file; and (6) disallow a bad debt reserve deduction.  We are aware of 
no reason to depart from this longstanding practice in making our determination under 
section 6015(f). 
Id. at 40–41 (citations omitted). 
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overlooked the rationale for requiring different standards for varying 
circumstances.  In addition, the Tax Court could have taken into account the 
benefits of applying a single standard, particularly when there is overlapping 
jurisdiction in the Tax Court and the district courts. 
As Professor Bryan T. Camp has demonstrated, RRA 1998 resulted in a 
shift from an inquisitorial model to an adversarial model of IRS action and tax 
collection.243  As Professor Camp explains, the Service has the history and 
experience to know what collection actions should be taken.244  This move 
toward a more adversarial tax collection system is largely a result of efforts by 
Congress to increase taxpayer rights. 
The Tax Court’s failure to apply a deferential standard of review will result 
in a greater shift away from the historically inquisitorial process whereby the 
Service determined the most appropriate way to collect assessed tax 
liabilities.245  The extent to which the courts interpose themselves in tax 
collection decisions raises concerns for efficient, timely tax collection.  
Judicial proceedings are time consuming and inevitably slow the collection 
process.  Interposing the courts in more collection cases will increase the strain 
on judicial resources, lower tax collections, and may undermine the Service’s 
collection functions.246  Voicing these concerns, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Living Care Alternatives of Utica v. United States, expressed 
concern that the courts might become involved in day-to-day collection 
decisions, an area clearly outside their expertise.247 
  There is no need to rely on any one of these explanations alone.  It is clear 
that the IRS was well within its discretion to reject . . . an offer in compromise.  
If the Appeals Officer mistakenly felt his hands were tied . . . there are 
administrative remedies available to point out such mistakes and allow the IRS 
an opportunity to re-examine its earlier decision. . . . [W]ithout a clear abuse of 
discretion in the sense of clear taxpayer abuse and unfairness by the IRS, as 
contemplated by Congress, the judiciary will inevitably become involved on a 
 
 243. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 9, at 133 (concluding that 
adversarial aspects of the reforms should be minimized while favoring a more inquisitorial 
interpretation).  Whether these changes are well advised is debatable.  Compare Camp, Replacing 
CDP, supra note 91 and Camp, The Costs of CDP, supra note 91 and Camp, The Failure of 
CDP, Part 2, supra note 91 and Camp, Failure of Collection Due Process, Part 1, supra note 91 
with Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, CDP, supra note 91. 
 244. See Professor Camp’s articles cited supra note 243. 
 245. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 9, at 22. 
 246. Cords, Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, supra note 91, at 1022. 
 247. 411 F.3d 621, 631 (6th Cir. 2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 223–25. 
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daily basis with tax enforcement details that judges are neither qualified, nor 
have the time, to administer.248 
Thus, the courts of appeals recognize that they are not to substitute their 
judgment for that of the appeals office in tax collection cases and need not 
know how to determine the tax liability to understand whether the appeals 
officer or the agency considered the correct factors in arriving at the 
challenged tax collection decision. 
In Robinette v. Commissioner, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer to 
introduce evidence that the appeals officer had refused to consider during the 
hearing, evidence regarding whether the taxpayer had violated the terms of an 
offer in compromise, allowing the Service to reinstate the original liability.249  
The Tax Court concluded that the APA was not applicable to it (the Tax 
Court), it was not bound by the rule of record review, and it could consider 
information not included in the administrative record.250  After considering the 
additional evidence that the taxpayer offered during the CDP hearing, a 
majority of the Tax Court concluded that the appeals officer had improperly 
concluded that he did not have the authority to reinstate the offer in 
compromise, and that it was an abuse of discretion for the appeals officer to 
issue a CDP determination allowing collection to proceed.251  The Tax Court 
substituted its judgment for that of the appeals office.  Further, the Service has 
contended that administrative law, particularly the APA provisions relating to 
judicial review and the rule of record review, apply to judicial review of 
collection determinations, even when appeal lies in the Tax Court.252  This 
argument has also been made by taxpayers appealing unfavorable CDP 
determinations.253 
The Service is charged with collecting taxes and making decisions about 
the most appropriate way to collect taxes.  With the possible exception of when 
the underlying liability is properly at issue, review of most CDP 
determinations does not require the substitution of the court’s judgment for the 
Service’s judgment.  In those instances, if the underlying liability is properly 
raised during the CDP hearing, the court should conduct a de novo review and, 
 
 248. Living Care Alternatives, 411 F.3d at 631 (citation omitted).  But cf. Robinette v. 
Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85 (2004) (overruling an appeals officer’s erroneous conclusion that he could 
not reinstate an offer in compromise), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 249. 123 T.C. at 102–03. 
 250. Id. at 96–97. 
 251. Id. at 112. 
 252. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2006) (the Service argued that the 
APA and the record rule were applicable to Tax Court review of CDP determinations); Johnson v. 
Comm’r, No. 20594-03S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-47, 2005 WL 883701, at *1 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 
18, 2005). 
 253. See, e.g., Olson v. Hernandez, 90 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-5669, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,594 (D. Ariz 2002). 
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in effect, “redetermine” the tax liability because collateral estoppel or res 
judicata will generally preclude subsequent judicial consideration of a refund 
claim. 
Similarly, when the Service denies a request for equitable innocent spouse 
relief, it has determined that the requesting spouse is not entitled to equitable 
relief.  The Code permits “the Secretary” to make this determination,254 and the 
question on review is whether that determination was an abuse of discretion.255  
The Tax Court has jurisdiction to review stand-alone innocent spouse requests 
and deficiency cases.256  In refund cases, innocent spouse claims can be 
brought in the district court or the Court of Federal Claims.257 
The use of different approaches to abuse of discretion simply as a result of 
the court in which the case is or can be brought violates sound tax policy.  
Contrary to the approach used by the district courts and approved by the Courts 
of Appeals that have considered the issue, the Tax Court does not apply 
administrative law when reviewing tax collection decisions.258  These different 
approaches undermine the certainty and benefits that should accrue from 
common standards. 
In reaching the conclusion that administrative law and the APA are 
inapplicable during its review of collection cases, the Tax Court has not fully 
considered the differences between the court’s deficiency jurisdiction and its 
jurisdiction with respect to most collection decisions.  In this context, Tax 
Court Judges Halpern and Holmes have written strong dissents favoring an 
application of administrative law and an abuse of discretion standard in these 
cases.259 
Moreover, an approach to collection cases contrary to the congressional 
mandate may violate the separation of powers that requires that the Congress 
create the laws, that the Executive Branch enforce the laws, and that the courts 
interpret the law.260  The current approach could lead to an even less efficient 
use of resources.  At least some collection decisions would be left to the Tax 
Court, which does not have the experience or expertise to efficiently make 
these decisions.  This would hamper the functioning of the tax collection 
system, slowing final findings relating to appropriate means of tax collection. 
Moreover, de novo review is not necessary to protect taxpayers.  Judicial 
review of CDP determinations and denials of innocent spouse relief and 
interest abatement do not eliminate taxpayers’ other opportunities to challenge 
 
 254. I.R.C. § 6015(f) (West Supp. 2007). 
 255. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 36–37 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 256. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Ewing, 122 T.C. at 37. 
 259. Id. at 56–71 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting). 
 260. Sargentich, supra note 144, at 609.  But see Pierce, supra note 144, at 89–90. 
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a tax liability.  Rather, the more recently created opportunities for taxpayer 
access to administrative procedures and judicial review in tax collection cases 
provide taxpayers with additional rights.  These rights add to the preexisting 
opportunities for evaluation and review of the taxpayer’s liability and payment 
options. 
Providing additional rights in tax collection cases is costly both in terms of 
the use of resources and in collection of revenues.  Administratively, CDP 
hearings require appeals officers to conduct hearings and make CDP 
determinations.  Innocent spouse claims require an administrative 
determination and may permit a request for reconsideration by the appeals 
office.  Because tax collection is slowed by requests for CDP hearings, 
innocent spouse relief, and interest abatement tax revenues are reduced by 
these rights.  Revenues are also reduced in most cases where relief is 
granted.261  Taxpayer CDP rights are currently the most litigated tax issue.262  
While not as frequently litigated, requests for innocent spouse relief and 
interest abatement also have a substantial cost. 
The informality of the CDP hearing procedures usually means that there is 
no transcript of the hearing.263  The absence of a transcript limits the record 
available for review, but that is not a bar to abuse of discretion review.264  
However, in many cases taxpayers can record a CDP hearing at their own 
expense.265 
 
 261. Revenues will be decreased if interest is not collected.  When innocent spouse relief is 
granted, the revenue effect is less certain, as the liability remains valid as to the other spouse; 
however, it may be unknown whether collection is possible.  In CDP cases, if a collection 
alternative is permitted, collections may be reduced (offer in compromise) or may take longer to 
collect (installment agreement), both of which reduce revenue.  However, if other assets are used 
to pay a liability in a CDP case, there will not be a revenue impact. 
 262. See generally Cords, How Much Process is Due, supra note 91, at 60–61 (discussing the 
projections and realities of the first several years of CDP requests and review).  A recent report by 
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reported that fully one quarter of the 
appeals office’s case load consists of CDP cases.  See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 556 (noting that collection due process litigation has led tax litigation 
each year since 2001). 
 263. The Internal Revenue Manual directs appeals officers to create a recording for the 
Service in cases where the taxpayer has a right to record the hearing and exercises that right.  
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 8.6.1.2.5. 
 264. Cox v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 237, 247 (2006), rev’d, 14 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e 
have never held or implied that any particular type of record is a necessary prerequisite for 
meaningful review.  Rather, our precedent and the administrative records underlying each of 
those proceedings counsel that a broad continuum exists in terms of the evidence we have found 
sufficient to support judicial consideration.”). 
 265. Keene v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003) (concluding that I.R.C. § 7521 provided 
taxpayers with a right to create an audio recording of a CDP hearing); cf. Compucel Serv. Corp. 
v. Comm’r, 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-1286; 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,284 (D. Md. 
2002) (concluding that there was no need to remand for an additional hearing because an 
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The Tax Court, along with other courts, has acknowledged that while 
transcripts may be helpful, they are not essential to permit a determination 
whether there was an abuse of discretion.266  The documentary record is often 
more relevant to the determination whether the proposed collection action is 
appropriate than is the discussion, as the documentary record will establish 
whether the taxpayer is eligible for a collection alternative or qualifies for 
innocent spouse relief.267  A transcript may be most helpful when the taxpayer 
properly raised the underlying liability during an appeals office hearing, but 
the underlying liability is seldom properly at issue during collection cases.268 
However, the use of significant resources does not justify inadequate 
performance by the agency.  One of the reasons that judicial review of agency 
action is preferred is to ensure that agencies adequately perform their duties.269  
In addition, the knowledge that a court may review an agency’s decision may 
provide an additional incentive for the agency to properly conduct its review 
functions. 
Any strain that Congress’s grant of additional rights places on the Service 
should not be cured through active assumption of those duties by the Tax 
Court.  The Tax Court should perform only the review intended by Congress.  
 
adequate record had been created).  Many of the courts that have concluded that there is a right to 
create an audio recording have also concluded that, in many cases, a CDP determination is not 
invalid even if the taxpayer was not given an opportunity to exercise the right to record the CDP 
hearing.  See, e.g., Frey v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1170, 1181 (2004); Durrenberger v. 
Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1000, 1002  (2004); Brashear v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 16, 19 
(2003); Kemper v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 12, 16 (2003).  All of these instances where failure 
to permit a recording have not invalidated the appeals officer’s CDP determination have been 
instances in which the taxpayer has proceeded to participate in the conduct of the CDP hearing 
despite the denial of an opportunity to create an audio recording.  However, as is the case with 
respect to some other agencies informal proceedings, some courts have noted that the failure to 
allow or require the creation of a transcript of the hearing makes judicial review of the CDP 
determination more difficult.  Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-7312; 
2001-01 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,130 (D. Colo. 2000). 
 266. Kemper, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 16 (concluding that it was not necessary to remand case to 
permit a hearing at which the taxpayer could make a recording when the taxpayer had participated 
in the original hearing).  But cf. Keene, 121 T.C. at 14–19 (concluding that I.R.C. § 7521(a)(1) 
required permitting a taxpayer to make an audio recording of a CDP hearing). 
 267. If not for the lack of sophistication and inarticulateness of many of the taxpayers 
involved in CDP hearings, correspondence and the submission of documentary information 
would probably be the primary consideration in most cases.  However, limiting CDP hearings to 
the exchange of documentary information would disadvantage those most likely to benefit from 
the process.  See Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing CDP, supra note 91, at 818–19. 
 268. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007) (limiting the circumstances under which the 
underlying liability may be raised to instances where the taxpayer “did not receive any statutory 
notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such 
tax liability”). 
 269. Fisher v. United States, 45 F.3d 396, 397 (10th Cir. 1995); 3 KOCH, supra note 59, 
§10.6[3]. 
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In most cases, courts should not create their own record or the substitute the 
court’s judgment for that of the Service in tax collection cases.  The Tax 
Court’s review in most collection cases should be limited to a review of the 
record the IRS creates, and then only for abuse of discretion.  In cases where 
the record is inadequate to support the collection decision, the most appropriate 
course of action is to remand the case to the Service to explain its decision or 
supplement the record.  In other cases, the court can reject the Service’s 
decision when that decision represents an abuse of discretion. 
3. Application to the Tax Court versus by the Tax Court 
In determining whether the Tax Court ought to apply the rules of 
administrative law, a distinction needs to be drawn between applying 
administrative law to the Tax Court and an application of administrative law 
by the Tax Court.  The Eighth Circuit pointed to this distinction in reversing 
Robinette.  The Eighth Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s conclusion that it was 
not limited to reviewing the record created at the hearing.270  The Eighth 
Circuit noted that the Tax Court’s position was based on an erroneous position 
in an earlier case, Nappi v. Commissioner.271  “Nappi focused erroneously on 
the status of the reviewing court, rather than on the status of the administrative 
body rendering the decision under review.  The Internal Revenue Service, of 
course, is an agency of the government, and review of its decisions may be 
governed by the APA.”272  Relying on the distinction between the application 
to and the application by the Tax Court, the court of appeals held that the 
record rule applied.273 
Notwithstanding the refusal of a majority of the Tax Court to apply the 
APA and administrative law in collection cases,274 Judge Halpern of the Tax 
Court has made an excellent case for the applicability of administrative law to 
the consideration of actions by the IRS.275  In these cases, Judge Halpern 
persuasively explains the proper approach to the review of CDP determinations 
under the APA and the principles of administrative law.  This approach can 
and should be extended to judicial review of other tax collection cases. 
In Robinette,276 dissenting Judges Halpern and Holmes explained the 
approach that should be used by the Tax Court in CDP cases, including 
following the rule of record review.277  Judges Halpern and Holmes made 
 
 270. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459–62. (8th Cir. 2006). 
 271. Id. at 461 n.5 (citing Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972)). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 460–62. 
 274. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95–105 (2004). 
 275. See, e.g., Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162, 172–74 (2002) (Halpern, J., concurring); 
Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 165–75 (2001) (Halpern, J., concurring). 
 276. 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 277. Id. at 121 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting). 
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similar arguments relating to innocent spouse cases in Ewing v. 
Commissioner.278 
Even though the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Robinette, the 
Tax Court could continue to apply its precedent in many other cases.  Under 
Golsen v. Commissioner, the reversal of Robinette will only apply to taxpayers 
petitioning the Tax Court from the Eighth Circuit, unless the Tax Court 
chooses to reverse its holding.279  It is unclear how far the Tax Court might 
extend its reasoning in Robinette.  First, the facts in Robinette indicate that 
throughout the hearing process the taxpayer had repeatedly attempted to 
present evidence regarding the efforts he made to file his tax returns and his 
pattern of filing at the end of the period of extensions.280  Second, the Tax 
Court has not overruled its decision in Magana v. Commissioner,281 which 
requires that, to be considered on appeal, an issue must be raised at the appeals 
office.  Finally, a number of the Tax Court’s judges indicated concern that the 
Tax Court should not extend its holding in Robinette to cases where the 
taxpayer had withheld information from the appeals officer and then attempted 
to present it at trial.282  Moreover, the Tax Court has cited Robinette in a 
number of cases, rejecting contentions that the Tax Court’s review is limited to 
the administrative record.283  This uncertainty in how tax law will be applied 
and what the tax law is in collection cases is unproductive. 
Because the Tax Court is a court and its decisions are reviewed by the 
courts of appeals with the deference afforded to judicial opinions of other 
courts, it is clear that administrative law and its standards of review do not 
apply to the Tax Court.  The Tax Court is a court and, throughout most of its 
history, it has acted as a court, performing quasi-judicial functions even as an 
executive agency.284  As a court, its decisions are reviewed in the same manner 
as those of other courts.285 
 
 278. 122 T.C. 32, 56 (2004) (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting). 
 279. 54 T.C. 742 (1970). 
 280. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 86–92. 
 281. 118 T.C. 488, 493–94 (2002) (holding that a taxpayer could not raise an issue on review 
that had not been raised at the CDP hearing). 
 282. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 112–17, 119–21 (Wells, Thornton, Wherry, JJ., concurring). 
 283. See, e.g., Enos v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 284, 305 n.17 (2004); see also Negoescu v. 
Comm’r, No. 11500-03S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-161, 2005 WL 3068362 (U.S. Tax Ct. Nov. 8, 
2005). 
 284. See supra Part I. 
 285. I.R.C. § 7482(a) (2000).  Because there was some question historically regarding the 
deference to be afforded to Tax Court decisions, Congress confirmed that the courts of appeals 
were to review Tax Court decisions in the same manner as district court decisions rendered after 
civil bench trials.  Section 7482 was enacted to resolve the question of the standard to be applied 
to Tax Court decisions.  As a result of this section, courts of appeals review the Tax Court’s 
application of law de novo and the Tax Court’s findings of fact for clear error.  Fargo v. Comm’r, 
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Although the Tax Court is not required to conform its procedures to the 
APA, the APA’s provisions relating to judicial review are applicable to the 
review of agency actions.  These provisions are controlling in the same way 
any other statute applicable to the actions of an agency, such as the Service, is 
controlling when applicable.  The APA framework and administrative law 
principles should be applied to the review of IRS actions, unless there is a 
provision to the contrary.286  This approach would increase certainty of result, 
as well as make review more efficient. 
4. Deficiency Cases Versus Other Tax Court Jurisdiction 
Congress has specifically provided for de novo review of deficiency 
redeterminations; the Tax Court is directed to “redetermine” deficiencies.287  
The court conducts a trial and makes its own finding of fact and conclusions 
regarding the correct tax liability.288  Thus, administrative law is not applied 
during judicial review of deficiency determinations in the Tax Court.  Final 
decisions of the Tax Court can be appealed to the courts of appeals, where they 
are reviewed in the same manner as the decisions of the district courts. 
However, it is not a necessary corollary to the nature of review in 
deficiency cases that Congress intended that the Tax Court use the same 
approach in all cases.  To determine the nature of the review it is necessary to 
consider the jurisdictional grant, the nature of the action or decision being 
reviewed, and the scope of review intended by the grant of jurisdiction. 
The standard applied should be determined by the question to be answered.  
In deficiency and refund cases the question is the correct amount of tax.  
Determining a tax liability requires that the court collect evidence.  To the 
contrary, in most tax collection cases, the question is whether the appeals 
officer’s collection decision was an abuse of discretion.  The former question 
must be considered de novo.  When answering the latter question, the court 
lacking the experience to make decisions about how best to collect tax 
liabilities should not substitute its judgment for that of the appeals officer.  De 
novo review is inappropriate. 
The next section addresses the benefits of administrative law in judicial 
review of tax collection decisions.  This section demonstrates why the Tax 
Court should reconsider its approach to these cases. 
 
447 F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006); Lurie v. Comm’r, 425 F.3d 1021, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 286. This is not to say that all decisions or actions taken by the IRS are or even should be 
subject to review. 
 287. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); § 6214(a) (West Supp. 2007). 
 288. See Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, CDP, supra note 91, at 821. 
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IV.  BENEFITS OF APPLYING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TO REVIEW OF IRS 
DECISIONS 
A. In General 
It is axiomatic that the tax laws must be applied consistently to all 
taxpayers.289  Without consistent application of the tax laws, the tax system is 
subject to claims that it is unfair, which will undermine the system’s 
effectiveness. 
Giving taxpayers a way to provide input during collections should increase 
the perception, if not the reality, that taxpayers receive fair and equitable 
treatment.290  Permitting all taxpayers the same type of review, ensures that 
similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly, furthering the principles of 
horizontal equity.  However, the use of different approaches or standards by 
different courts will potentially impair horizontal equity. 
Although inconsistent results and multiple opportunities to seek relief in 
tax cases are not uncommon, creating additional such inconsistencies should 
not be done unnecessarily or lightly.291  For instance, when considering the 
taxpayer’s liability, whether during a deficiency case or a refund case, the Tax 
Court and the district courts use the same approach.  Both courts conduct de 
novo trials in these cases to determine the correct tax liability. 
Likewise, in other tax cases, where there is overlapping jurisdiction, and 
when the decisions being reviewed closely resemble decisions made by other 
agencies, common standards of review should be used.  However, the Tax 
Court does not apply administrative law rules in nondeficiency cases, while the 
district courts do.292  As a result of the courts using different approaches, 
taxpayers may receive inconsistent treatment solely because of the court with 
jurisdiction over the case.  This has nothing to do with the substance of the 
case.  Applying administrative law during judicial review of tax collection 
cases would increase consistency between similarly situated taxpayers.  
Additionally, this approach would create more consistency between 
administrative agencies. 
 
 289. There are two axes across which equal treatment may be viewed.  The first is horizontal 
equity, which requires that similarly situated taxpayers be treated similarly.  The second is 
vertical equity, which requires that differently situated taxpayers be treated differently.  See 
generally Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelism 
and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (2006). 
 290. Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, CDP, supra note 91, at 821.  This may be a case 
where perception is reality. 
 291. But see Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[U]niformity of 
decision among the circuits is vitally important on issues concerning the administration of the tax 
laws.”). 
 292. Book, supra note 91, at 1173–74. 
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Using administrative law in tax collection cases could increase judicial 
efficiency.  By limiting review to the record created during the administrative 
proceeding, less fact-finding will be needed, which will permit courts to more 
quickly and efficiently decide these cases.  Moreover, fairness and taxpayer 
rights should not be harmed by the application of a deferential standard of 
review because abuse of discretion review is not meaningless.  A deferential 
standard of review provides adequate protection against arbitrary action.  
Decisions that may be judicially challenged are more likely to be carefully 
considered than those not subject to review.   
The informal nature of the proceedings may result in a limited or even 
insufficient record.293  However, that does not prevent the hearing from being 
fair or limit the availability of meaningful judicial review.294  When the record 
is inadequate, a court can remand a case for additional proceedings in the 
appeals office or receive evidence to explain the record and the appeals 
officer’s determination.  Remand to the appeals office is not an insignificant 
remedy.  Although it might seem that remand to the same agency, office, and 
appeals officer would be unlikely to change the result the second time, this 
may not be the case.  In its order remanding a case for further proceedings, the 
court indicates the reason it found the prior proceeding to be inadequate.  Upon 
remand for an abuse of discretion, it is likely that the decision will either be 
different or more carefully reasoned, even if the same appeals officer is 
involved.  The agency is likely to try to cure the defect in the proceeding; the 
second time around the agency may reach a different conclusion than it did 
first time.295 
B. In Tax Collection Cases 
While a number of courts have used administrative law in tax collection 
cases, only the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely addressed 
whether administrative law rules apply to the Tax Court’s review of tax 
collection decisions.296  All of the courts considering CDP appeals have 
approved the use of abuse of discretion review when the underlying liability 
 
 293. Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, 86 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2000-7312, 2000-7318; 2001-01 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,130 (D. Colo. 2000) (“[T]he lack of a record makes it impossible to 
tell what was discussed at the hearing and what factors were considered . . . .”). 
 294. Keene v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 8, 12 (2003); Hardy v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 
2003-2668; 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,542 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Compucel Serv. Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-1286, 2002-1288; 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,284 (D. 
Md. 2002). 
 295. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L. J. 984, 1059–60 (1990) (concluding that data 
evaluated showed a “major change” by the agency after remand). 
 296. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459–61 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing the Tax Court’s 
holding that the Tax Court was not required to apply the rule of review on the record). 
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was not at issue during the CDP hearing.297  However, the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion in Robinette v. Commissioner may have little impact on most 
taxpayers requesting review of a tax collection decisions.  The potential 
inconsistency of results may be exacerbated by the consolidation of 
jurisdiction over CDP appeals in the Tax Court.298  As a result of the Tax 
Court’s conclusion that it does not have to apply the record rule and other 
principles of administrative law, individuals and businesses that request review 
of other (nondeficiency) decisions by the Service are likely to receive different 
treatment and quite possibly different results based solely on whether they are 
permitted to seek review in the district court or the Tax Court.  In most 
instances, tax collection cases do not afford taxpayers the choice of forum that 
they have become accustomed to in other tax litigation. 
While the deficiency and refund procedures are designed to allow full 
development of a taxpayer’s total liability, in most instances, tax collection 
cases should be used only to determine, as expeditiously as possible, whether 
the proposed collection actions are appropriate.299  Tax collection cases 
provide a supplemental right.  Taxpayers do not lose any other available rights.  
Even taxpayers who have not yet had an opportunity to challenge the 
underlying liability can make a refund claim after payment.300 
In almost all cases in which a taxpayer appeals a tax collection decision, 
the court need only determine whether the IRS’s decision was an abuse of 
discretion.  This will permit the scope of and time for trial to be limited, 
minimizing the impact on tax collections.  De novo trials, which require 
extensive trial preparation and the presentation of evidence, will dramatically 
slow tax collection.  RRA 1998, CDP rights, increased availability of innocent 
spouse relief, and provision for interest abatement along with the right for 
judicial review seems to have been intended to provide a check on the 
Service’s discretion.  To entirely restructure the tax collection system, 
Congress should be explicit.  That only certain tax collection decisions are 
reviewable and Congress has provided for abuse of discretion review does not 
suggest that Congress intended to set aside unspecified long-standing 
principles.  Moreover, expedient and efficient tax collection remains important.  
 
 297. Action Employment Res., Inc. v. United States, 158 F. App’x 67 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Tinnerman v. Comm’r, 156 F. App’x 111, 112 (11th Cir. 2005); Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 
144, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); Orum v. Comm’r, 412 F.3d 819, 820 (7th Cir. 2005); Living Care 
Alternative of Utica v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 2005); Jones v. Comm’r, 338 
F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 298. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 299. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2007). 
 300. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).  This may not address the concern that some taxpayers may not 
be able to pay and then sue.  However, to the extent that is seen as a problem, there are direct 
ways that could be addressed, such as granting the Tax Court greater jurisdiction or increasing 
access to the Tax Court. 
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To permit challenges to the underlying liability in all cases would slow the tax 
collection process and require that the entire tax collection process be 
reconfigured.  Systematically permitting challenges to the underlying liability 
during the collection process would significantly slow the tax collection 
process.  In addition, some taxpayers would obtain an opportunity for review 
that is not available to taxpayers who promptly paid their taxes. 
In most cases, neither the taxpayer’s nor the government’s interest is 
advanced by permitting challenges to the underlying liability after the tax has 
been assessed.  Because deficiency and refund procedures are designed to 
allow a de novo determination of the correct tax liability, such litigation can be 
time consuming.  In addition, taxpayers can only avail themselves of a single 
opportunity to challenge the liability—additional attempts to challenge the 
liability are generally barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.301 
Permitting taxpayers to challenge the underlying liability during the 
collection process usually will not permit a taxpayer to fully develop a case 
regarding the correct liability because collection must proceed as expeditiously 
as possible.  Post-assessment, pre-collection processes are much better suited 
to a consideration of whether the taxpayer is entitled to a collection alternative, 
whether innocent spouse relief is available, or whether other means of 
collection would balance the government’s needs against the taxpayer’s 
interest, minimizing the intrusiveness of the collection. 
CONCLUSION 
A consistent approach to judicial review of tax collection decisions will 
benefit taxpayers and tax collection and administration.  Moreover, following 
the relatively clear direction of Congress to review tax collection decisions for 
abuse of discretion will reduce the workload relating to tax collection cases.  
Using the rule of record review, it would be unnecessary to conduct time and 
resource intensive de novo trials and increase the incentive for taxpayers to 
present all relevant issues at the hearing.  The Tax Court will be able to more 
efficiently handle the other cases on its docket that require de novo review.  All 
taxpayers should receive a quicker adjudication, reducing the total amount of 
interest and penalties that will ultimately be due on unpaid liabilities. 
To achieve these benefits, the Tax Court must reconsider its approach to 
the review of judicial appeals of CDP determinations.  The Tax Court should 
realize that not only does the law require that it limit its review in CDP appeals 
to the record created by the Service, unless the underlying liability is at issue, 
but also that it is prudent, efficient, and beneficial to tax administration that it 
do so.  The Tax Court should consider the arguments raised by Tax Court 
Judges Halpern and Holmes in support of the application of administrative law.  
 
 301. Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598–99 (1948). 
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It should also give close attention to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Robinette.302 
However, given the Tax Court’s long-standing reluctance to apply the 
APA and administrative law, the Tax Court may be hesitant to significantly 
change its approach to the review of IRS collection decisions.  Rather, it may 
be necessary for additional cases to be brought to the circuit courts of appeals, 
requiring the Tax Court to apply the rules of administrative law in cases arising 
in each circuit.  Alternatively, Congress could direct the Tax Court regarding 
the appropriate approach.  Both of these alternatives require external 
intervention, which could be avoided if the Tax Court heeds the wisdom of the 
Eighth Circuit’s Robinette decision.  Reconsideration by the Tax Court would 
be more expeditious.  Nonetheless, it is essential to proper operation of the tax 
collection system that changes occur with respect to judicial review of tax 
collection decisions.  Voluntary change by the courts is preferable, but unless 
that happens, legislative direction is needed.  That almost ten years after the 
enactment of RRA 1998 the judges of the Tax Court are still debating whether 
de novo fact-finding or traditional abuse of discretion review is appropriate 
suggests that there is still a ways to go in settling the debate, and legislative 
intervention may be unavoidable. 
 
 
 302. See 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
